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Human capital accumulation by individual workers and urbanization are two cen-
tral factors underlying sustained economic growth (Lucas, "On the Mechanics of
Economic Development," Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988, 22, 3-42 [72];
Jones and Romer, "The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Population, and
Human Capital," American Economic Journal: Macro-economics, 2010, 2(1), 224-
245 [14]). The persistent incentive for human capital accumulation depends cru-
cially on spillover eects derived from close proximity to human capital in an
urban context (Lucas, "Life earnings and rural-urban migration," Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 2004, 112(1), S29-S59 [73]; Lucas, "Trade and the Diusion of
the Industrial Revolution," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2009,
1(1), 1-25 [74]). This dissertation builds on the work of Lucas (2004) to study
the incentive for rural (low-skilled) workers to migrate to the urban sector and to
invest in human capital accumulation. Our focus is on the role of nancing con-
straints, which in reality discourage human capital accumulation by low-skilled
workers but are omitted in Lucas (2004).
Workers must allocate time to learning in order to accumulate human capital,
forgoing employment income. Absent borrowing constraints, low-skilled workers
can smooth their consumption by borrowing from future employment income,
which is expected to grow with human capital. When the nancing constraint
is binding, the low-skilled workers must lower current consumption to nance
learning and thus face a reduced incentive for human capital accumulation due to
vi
the greater opportunity cost of learning. We solve the dynamic model in Lucas
(2004) subject to a borrowing constraint. We show that the lifetime utility of
low-skilled workers is reduced when they are unable to borrow from future income
to smooth consumption during the period of unemployment devoted to human
capital accumulation.
We use the model to study several stylized facts and rural-urban migration policy
issues for an economy in transition from a low-skilled economy to a high-skilled
economy. First, we show that, when low-skilled workers are unable to borrow
from future income, the saving rate of rural household will rise in response to the
opening of the urban sector to rural migrants and the attendant opportunities for
protable human capital accumulation. This increased saving rate is necessary for
nancing the initial period of unemployment in cities in order for new migrants
to catch up in human capital accumulation. In contrast, absent the borrowing
constraint, the rural saving rate will be negative in response to the opening of
the urban sector, as low-skilled workers attempt to smooth consumption in an-
ticipation of higher future income. Second, we show that a rise in rural-urban
migration cost in the presence of a binding borrowing constraint for low-skilled
workers reduces their incentive to migrate to cities to accumulate human capital.
Consequently, rural-urban migration, human capital accumulation and economic
growth all slow down and rural-urban income disparity widens. Third, we show
that the urban government can help to mitigate the borrowing constraint faced
by low-skilled workers by subsidizing their migration to cities and nancing the
subsidy with increased future income-tax revenue produced by an expanded high-
skilled urban workforce. Such a subsidy program is self-nancing and will raise not
only the lifetime welfare of the low-skilled migrants but also the rate of rural-urban
migration, human capital accumulation, and economic growth. We use numerical
analysis to quantify the impact of the borrowing constraint, rural-urban migration
cost, and the self-nancing migration subsidy programs.
vii
Finally, we apply the results of the model to shed lights on China's recent expe-
rience of urbanization and economic development. We observe a signicant rise
in rural household saving rate (above the urban household saving rate) in the late
1990s when the urban housing and labor markets are liberalized to allow rural
workers the freedom to live and work in cities. This phenomenon, not well ex-
plained by the previous studies, is consistent with the predictions of our model. In
addition, we document evidence from extant literature regarding the lagging ur-
banization, lagging human capital accumulation, and widening rural-urban income
gaps in China in relation to income growth. These features are consistent with
a rural-urban migration (and human capital accumulation) process constrained
by a lack of nancing and high opportunity costs of human capital accumulation
for low-skilled migrants. We discuss the causes for the high opportunity cost of
human capital accumulation for low-skilled migrants. Furthermore, we use the
insights from our model to argue that the welfare implications of many rural-urban
migration policy issues currently debated in China can be better understood from
the point of view of mitigating the nancing constraint for human capital accumu-
lation by low-skilled migrant families. For instance, the urban low-income housing
benets should be extended to rural migrant families to encourage their human
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation of this research
In China, today's younger rural generation aspires for decent jobs in the service
sector or even to white-collar jobs, unlike their parents who had migrated from
rural to urban areas only aimed to be out of poverty. Reported by Rahul Jacob
in Financial Times in 2012 1, Mr Zeng, a 23-year-old rural boy in China, said he
tried to nd a formal job that only required eight hours a day in cities because he
thought his unskilled and routine factory work was useless and meaningless and
he had learnt nothing by doing it for a long time. Unfortunately, he not even had
a formal job in the city because he had quit school where he was young. Although
he realized the importance of education and skill, it is hard for him to accumulate
human capital in the city due to less energy and lack of nancial support. Mr
Zeng is the typical representative of new rural generations. Therefore, whether
to migration is a dilemma for rural households. They migrate to cities for the
high quality of life and a nice working environment, but in reality, they cannot
get a high added-value job in cities because they are usually low-skilled workers
1 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/85ce9468-93b5-11e1-baf0-00144feab49a.html
1
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and also lack of money and preferential policies to support their human capital
accumulation.
The objective of this thesis is to build a model and framework to analyze the hu-
man capital accumulation of low-skilled workers during the rural-urban migration
process and to provide solutions that can accelerate the rural-urban migration and
speed up skill transformation.
Rural-urban migration is not only a physical movement of people from rural areas
to urban areas2, but more importantly, it is the transformation of a low-skilled
worker to a high-skilled worker. Rural-urban migration is a natural process and a
result of the dierence between traditional agricultural technology and modern
industrial technology. In general, urban population growth in most countries
is more rapid than total population growth because migrants from rural areas
contribute almost half of its growth.
The high urbanization level is accompanying the high average education level and
industrialization development. The country with higher average education and in-
dustrialization level often has more population residing in urban areas. However,
some developing countries do not follow this regular pattern, especially China.
The urbanization in China is slower than its industrialization; in addition, av-
erage schooling level is still below the world's average level. Furthermore, gross
domestic saving ratio and rural saving rate in China are so prominent in the
lagging urbanization process.
Migration is a dilemma for rural households with a borrowing constraint, as above
Mr Zeng' story described. On the one hand, the human capital spillover plays
a key role in rural-urban migration and skill transformation (Lucas, 2004 [73]),
which attracts rural people out of rural area into urban areas by borrowing money
from future to invest in their human capital accumulation in cities. The rural
2Rural-Urban migration has the same meaning with Urbanization, dened by the United
Nations as movement of people from rural to urban areas with population growth.
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migrant can get superior income after successfully become a high-skilled worker by
accumulating human capital for the advantage of the knowledge spillover in cities.
On the other hand, borrowing constraint is a major obstacle for rural households'
human capital accumulation in cities. Borrowing constraint decelerates the human
capital accumulation of low-skilled rural workers and delays rural-urban migration
as well, because it can alter consumption and saving behavior of rural migrants
and decrease the incentive for human capital investment.
Rural migrants must consider a tradeo between human capital spillover in cities
and borrowing constraints. Absent borrowing constraints, low-skilled workers can
smooth their consumption by borrowing from future employment income, which
expects to grow with their human capital. When the borrowing constraint is
binding, the low-skilled workers, if he want to get high income by invest on his
human capital, must lower current consumption to nance their learning, conse-
quently they will face a reduced incentive for human capital accumulation due to
the greater opportunity cost of learning.
Therefore, we are attempting to solve the dynamic Lucas model [74] subject to
a borrowing constraint to answer those questions. How to nance human capi-
tal accumulation? When to migrate to a city? What about the change of social
welfare with borrowing constraint? Furthermore, this extended model with bor-
rowing constraint can be shed lights on the experience of rural-urban migration
and economic development. In addition, this model can analyze the impacts of
institutional policies on rural-urban migration and human capital accumulation of
low-skilled rural workers.
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1.2 Stylized facts
Some stylized facts of global urbanization process have oered in this section.
Generally, rural-urban migration is associated with economic development and
growth. Most of the developed countries have nished the urbanization process
by the advancing of the Industrial Revolution. In the United States, about 5% of
the population lived in cities in 1800, but about 50% of the population lived in
cities by 1920. Throughout the 19th century, the US was urbanizing. The same
was true for most European societies during the 19th century, such as UK, France
etc. In 2010 about 80% of the US population lives in cities or suburbs, it seems
the urbanization in US is close to an end stage.
Figure 1.1: Flow process of rural-urban migration
Source: http://www.unicef.org/sowc08/docs/sowc08 table StatisticalTables.pdf
However, some less-developed countries and most developing countries are still
undergoing urbanization process in the report of World Bank the percentage of
population residing in urban areas is only 45.55 in 2010, comparing to the 77.57 of
more-developed countries. In practice, urbanization from rural land to urban areas
is mainly economic activities for those less developed and developing countries, in
Asia, Africa and some part of South America (Fig 1.1).
Since 60's of the twentieth century, numbers of developing countries have been
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accelerating their rural-urban migration due to progress of industrialization, open-
ness of international trade, technology progress, augment of living level inequality
and social welfare between the rural and urban area. This spatial transformation





























Log value of GNI
Figure 1.2: Urbanization level and GNI per capita in 2010
Source: The World Bank
Table 1.1: Annual income growth and urban population growth
Countries Brazil Columbia S. Korea Indonesia China
Annual urban population 1950-70 1951-73 1960-70 1980-95 1990-2004
growth 5.2 4.9 6.1 4.8 3.6
Annual per cap real income 1965-75 1965-75 1965-75 1980-95 1990-2004
growth 6.3 3.1 6.7 5.0 9.1
Source: Henderson, 2007. [50]
The relationship between urbanization level and the per capita GNI has been
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illustrated in Figure 1.2. In general, there is a positive relevance of urbanization
level and the per capita GNI. However, the urbanization level in China is less than
the average level in the world in terms of its gross national income per capita. The
possible explanation of higher per capita real income and lower urbanization is that
the minority urban population possesses the most part of gross national incomes
and the rural population suers from the low income growth.
In addition, Henderson(2007 [50]) proposed some data to analyze the annual in-
come growth and urbanization growth within ve countries in Table 1.1. The per
capita real income growth is nearly same as the urban population growth in Brazil,
Columbia, South Korea and Indonesia. Nonetheless, there is a big gap between
the per capita real income growth 9.1% and the urban population growth 3.6% in
China. Again, it shows that most people with higher real income reside in urban





























% of Labor force with at least secondary education level 
China
Figure 1.3: Relationship of urbanization level and education level of labor force
Source: The World Bank And NBS of China
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Figure 1.3 3shows the relationship between urbanization level and the labor force
with higher education level proportion in some countries in 2005. In general, the
share of labor force with higher education level positively related to the proportion
of urban population in the country. The ratio of the labor force with higher
education level to total labor force is higher in those countries, which have the
higher level of urbanization. Intuitively, China's education level of labor force
(20.5%) is below the average level and is not coincident with its urbanization
level (42.5%). The China's skill transformation is slower than other developing
countries.
In terms of the completeness of the urbanization process, it briey divides four
types of country in the world. Type i includes those countries, which have com-
pleted industrialization and almost in the end of the stage of urbanization. U.K
and USA is representative. Before 1960 this urbanization process has been already
nished in most developed countries, for example the share of urban population
in UK practically does not change at almost 79.0 percent in the recent 60 years.
Consequently, with rural-urban migration, the transfer of knowledge has outstand-
ing achievement. In 2005, the percentage of labor force with primary education is
only 9.9% in USA comparing with 60.4% of the labor force with tertiary education.
Type ii includes countries, which has had undergone the highest urbanization rate
and got the higher level of urbanization with higher skill transformation rate for
the past 60 years, but has been still going through the economic structure tran-
sition from traditional dual economy to modern monistic economy, for example
South Korea, Brazil and other countries. China and Philippines are the Type iii
country, which is in the intermediate stage of the urbanization process with higher
urbanization rate and the slower skill transformation comparing their rural-urban
migration level. Country of Type iv has less share of the urban population and is
just beginning his own urbanization, such as India and Egypt.
3The higher education level includes the secondary and tertiary education. Because only 30
countries have the % labor force with higher education level data in 2010 in Word Bank, we
choose the year 2005. The China data comes from the 2005 1% population survey data.
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The rural-urban migration is still a main economic activity for less developed
countries. The portion of agricultural production of total production and agricul-
tural employment ratio of total employment is actually continuously declining with
rural-urban migration process. It ts the predictions of migration theories that
low-skilled farmers will become higher-skilled producers with the spatial relocation
and completion of knowledge transfer. As a result, the traditional land-intensive
dual- economy will transfer to human capital-intensive monistic economy. City, as
the places in which new migrants can accumulate their human capital and ben-
et greatly from the environment of knowledge spillover, is more attractive for
rural household to move into it. However, it is not clear why those developing
countries have dierent urbanization path even if they have already participated
in global opened economy and what are the principal factors stimulate or im-
pede rural-urban migration and skill transformation? Lucas (2004, 2009 [73] [74])
demonstrated that human capital spillover in cities was the main motivation for
migration decision of rural household and the "openness" could be used to mea-
sure the external eects of human capital in country. However, he did not pay any
attention to those factors, which impede the rural-urban migration, for instance
borrowing constraints and institutional regulation for low-skilled rural workers.
The rural-urban migration is still a main economic activity for less developed
countries. And the portion of agricultural production of total production and
agricultural employment ratio of total employment is actually continuously de-
clining with rural-urban migration process. This ts the predictions of migration
theories that low-skilled farmers will become higher-skilled producers with the spa-
tial relocation and completion of knowledge transfer. As a result, the traditional
land-intensive dual- economy will be transferred to human capital-intensive monis-
tic economy. City, as places in which new migrants can accumulate their human
capital and benet much from the environment of knowledge spillover, is more
attractive for rural household to move into it. But why those developing countries
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have dierent urbanization path even if they have already participated in global
opened economy and what are the main factors stimulate or impede rural-urban
migration and skill transformation? Lucas (2004, 2009 [73] [74]) demonstrated that
human capital spillover in cities was the main motivation for migration decision of
rural household and the openness could be used to measure the external eects of
human capital in country. However, he did not pay any attention to those factors
which impede the rural-urban migration, for example borrowing constraints for
low-skilled rural workers.
Those negative factors are also extremely important in studies of rural-urban
migration and cannot be ignored. Simultaneously considering the positive external
eect of human capital and the negative constraint inuence on urbanization, this
thesis proposes an extended model to capture those interrelated eects on rural-
urban migration and skill transformation.
1.3 Statement of this research
By extending a Lucas-type rural-urban migration model incorporating the borrow-
ing constraint, this thesis will identify the inuences of borrowing constraint and
institutional policies on rural-urban migration and human capital accumulation of
low-skilled rural migrants.
Rural-urban migration courses and the behaviors of potential migrants are illus-
trated in the Figure 1.4. People who live in rural land rstly, go through three
stages in his lifetime to maximum his lifetime utility value. In the rst stage, he
lives in rural land and allocates his income between consumption and saving to
maximum of his preference. He faces a choice whether migration to the city or
not. If the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas is not large enough or
the money is not enough to support his learning life in urban areas, he will stay in
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Figure 1.4: Flow process of rural-urban migration
rural land and work hard to save more. If the knowledge gap between urban and
rural areas is large enough and enough money is enough (can be borrowed from
future or the current savings), he will move into city to accumulate his human
capital and desire to become an urban producer as soon as possible. Meanwhile,
he enters the second stage. During this period, he must allocate his time between
learning and working to choose the human capital accumulation path. Since it
is more eective to spend time in learning than in working in cities, he focuses
on learning during knowledge transition period. In the last stage, as long as he
catches up with the high-skilled urban workers, he becomes an urban producer
and accomplishes the entire migration process as well.
In short, this thesis focuses on the relationship of rural-urban migration process
and the human capital accumulation of low-skilled rural migrants, and the impact
of borrowing constraints and institutional policies on urbanization and economic
development as well.
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Our research questions are motivated by facts mentioned above. There are two
principal determinants for rural-urban migration: human capital spillover and a
borrowing constraint. Considering borrowing constraint, this thesis will extend the
Lucas-type rural-urban migration model, analyze eects of borrowing constraint
on human capital accumulation of low-skilled rural workers during transition pe-
riod in cities, and explore how the constraint aects the migration behavior and
consumption-saving pattern of rural households. Furthermore, this research stud-
ies about what the government can do to accelerate urbanization, accelerate skill
transformation and improve social welfare by building the following model and
framework:
1) Build Lucas-type rural-urban migration model incorporating borrowing con-
straint.
This thesis extends Lucas-type rural-urban migration model incorporating
the borrowing constraint, explores how the borrowing constraint aects con-
sumption and saving behavior of rural migrants, and inuences rural-urban
migration process. Borrowing constraint slows down their rural-urban mi-
gration and retards skill transformation and economic growth. According to
Lucas' ndings, the optimal choice for low-skilled migrant is to migrate to
cities as soon as possible and do full-time learning until they become urban
producers. Hereby, later migration choice of migrants with the borrowing
constraint is suboptimal and incurs some loss of social welfare. Without
borrowing constraint, rural people can borrow money and nance his living
during skill transformation period in urban areas and choose to migrate as
earlier as possible while the knowledge gap between rural and urban is large
enough and the external eect of human capital accumulation is prominent.
In borrowing constraint, rural people have to adjust their consumption pat-
tern to save money in rural land in order to support their future human
capital investment, but this adjusted behavior will not only delay migration
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time but also reduce their lifetime utility. This extended model can capture
the dierent migration behavior by means of comparing those two types
of the urbanization process. Moreover, this extended model can be used
to examine the magnitude of the adverse inuence of borrowing constraint
on rural-urban migration and interrelated eects of knowledge spillover and
borrowing constraint together.
2) Develop a unied framework to analyze urbanization-related policies consid-
ering borrowing constraint
Depending on this extended Lucas-type model, a unied economic frame-
work can be developed to evaluate the consequences of rural-urban migra-
tion with borrowings constraint. Constraint can come from a number of
institutional policies, such as house policy, educational policy, personal loan
policies etc. Each policy has a dierent impact on the borrowing constraint
and then a distinct impact on the urbanization process and human capital
accumulation. Thus, this extended model help to evaluate the consequence
of distinctive institutional policies and improve those urbanization related
policies.
1.4 Structure of this thesis
The thesis includes the following chapters.
In Chapter 2, it demonstrates China's urbanization history and summarizes the
characteristics and problems of the rural-urban migration. In Chapter 3, literature
review is about two aspects linked with this research: the relationship of urbaniza-
tion and knowledge spillover and those typical rural-urban migration models. In
particular, this thesis highlights the Lucas-type endogenous rural-urban migration
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model. Chapter 4 and 5 elaborate on how to build the extended Lucas-type rural-
urban migration model with borrowing constraint and do the numerical study sub-
sequently. In Chapter 7, some China's urbanization- related policies are analyzed
based on the unied extended model. In the last chapter, it sums up contributions
of this thesis on rural-urban migration and prospects further research aspects.
Chapter 2
China's urbanization experience
2.1 Urbanization history in China
Since the mid-1980s with "Reform and Opening up Policy", China has experienced
remarkable economic growth in the last twenty years, meanwhile mass rural-urban
migration has begun and has still continued over time. From 1978 to 2010, the
GDP increased 20.7 times with an average growth rate of 9.95 % (as 1979 =100)
and the GDP per capita has reached 29992 yuan with an average growth rate of
8.8%. In 2010, China has been the biggest economy only second to USA in the
world.
China's urbanization progress also has been made a conspicuous achievement.
From the report of United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs,
Population Division, the urbanization rate in China (excluding Hong Kong and
Marco) 49.95% in 2010, closed to the world average level 50.28%. However, the
speed of China's urbanization is unprecedented. According to Professor Lu Dadao,
president of the Geographical Society of China (GSC), China took 22 years to
increase its urbanization to 39.1% from 17.9%. It took Britain 120 years, the US,
80 years, and Japan more than 30 years to accomplish this. It is obvious that
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Urbanization process in China 
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Figure 2.1: % of population residing in urban areas in China from 1949-2010
Source: 1950-2011, NBS OF CHINA
China, as a developing country with high rate of economic growth, is experiencing
a signicant population migration from rural lands to urban areas.
In this section, we briey review the historical course of China's urbanization and
rural-urban migration after the founding of New China in 1949. From 1949 to
2010, the urbanization level of China increased from 10.64% to 49.95% while the
total urban population grew from 57.7 million to 669.8 million. Based on the
stability of political and economic situation, China has experienced two periods
in the last sixty years: the rst controlled urbanization period from 1949 to 1977
and the second exible and rapid urbanization period from 1978 to 2010.
1. The controlled urbanization period (1949-1977)
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Before 1978, the economic development strategy and population distribu-
tion were totally controlled by central government. The China's urbaniza-
tion went through dierent conicting labor mobility regulations. After the
rst "Rehabilitation" plan and the "Great Leap Forward", which aimed to
increase production and speed up industrialization process, China's urban
population grew faster and rural-urban migration increased dramatically.
However, with the command of "going to the rural and mountainous areas"
and the beginning of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the urban pop-
ulation decreased and the urban to rural migrants began to increase, the
urbanization level decreased from 17.98% in 1966 to 17.55% in the end of
1977.
2. The exible and rapid urbanization period (1978 -2010)
The well-know Reform and Open-door policies was adopted in 1978, which
showed that China has began the important transition time from the planned
economy to the market oriented economy. So far, China achieved dramatic
economic success that GDP increased 20.7 times with an average growth
rate of 9.95 % (as 1979 =100) and the GDP per capita has reached 29992
yuan with an average growth rate of 8.8%. Especially, with implementation
of the household contract responsibility system and relax of the household
registration system (Hukou system), rural surplus labor forces had been
liberated and started move into the high-income urban areas. Thus, the
urbanization level increased from 17.92% in 1978 to 49.95% in 2010 with an
annual increment of 3.26 percent.
2.2 Characteristics of rural-urban migration
China is unique with its dualistic society in the world. Rural migrants go through
the dierent process from that of other developing countries, since China has the
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separated rural and urban part not only in the geographic aspect, but more in the
economic and social aspect via the hukou system. A hukou is about household
registration record which ocially identies a person as a resident of an area and
includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth.
2.2.1 Regulated rural-urban migration
China has a very special political circumstance in the world, especially her house-
hold registration policies. Unlike other developing countries, China's household
registration system (Hukou system) was not only used to collect population in-
formation and track the personal status, but also to be the political tools, which
can directly control and regulate population distribution between urban and rural
areas, even can aect the social welfare (Chan, 1999a, b [12] [13]). Thus Individ-
uals were broadly categorized as a "rural" or "urban" resident. A worker, who
seeks to move from the country to urban areas to take up non-agricultural work,
would have to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers
allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. Migrants who worked outside
their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for personal loans,
employer-provided housing and health care. Moreover there have lots of limitation
for rural migrants about education, employment, marriage and so on. Therefore,
rural-urban migration is regulated by the economic and social aims of the central
and local government.
As realized the importance of urbanization on economic growth, the Chinese gov-
ernment has begun relax the regulation of household registration policies. In
1989, with enacting of urban development law "tightly control the growth of large
cities and actively promote the development of medium and small-sized cities",
the population from rural to urban rapidly increased. There were kinds of reasons
for executing this urban development law. First, it can stimulate the fast growth
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of medium and small-sized cities by population movement to avoid the exceeding
unbalanced regional development, which was found in the most developing coun-
tries. Second, it can contribute to the social stability. The local governments of big
cities in China are more cautious about relaxing the household registration system
than of medium and small-sized cities, because a large crowd of rural migrants to
big cities may bring lots of negative and serious implications in terms of social
stability, such as crime, pollution, the lack of security and others. Third, local
government of big cities pays an attention on the city management and operation.
The marginal cost of absorbing one more rural migrant in big cities is higher than
in medium and small-sized cities. Therefore the local government of big cities is
always cautious on the relaxing of household registration system.
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Source: the 1% sample survey of the 4th national census: Table 6.4.6 (Zha,
1996 [106])
Although some political limitation of rural-urban migration relaxed and the ex-
ible mobility of labor force increased, the non-hukou migrants have still been
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dominated the total rural-urban migration in China and the hukou status has
also had signicant impacts on the whole rural-urban migration process. The Ta-
ble 2.2.1 summarizes the composition of hukou and non-hukou migration. The
non-hukou migrants with agricultural household status share the 90.2% in the
total rural-urban migration, and the agricultural migrants with 94.8 percent of
whole rural-urban migration are the non-hukou migrants. On the other hand, the
majority of the formal hukou migration is the non-agricultural migrants. This
results provide evidences that the current rural-urban migration in China still the
non-hukou migration.
In fact, this type of rural-urban migration with non-hukou status is unstable,
namely "oating population" or "temporary population". This movement deci-
sion of most parts of rural migrants is motivated by the labor market forces of
demand and supply in dierent cities. Thus it is hard to become the permanent
urban resident for the most of rural migrants, considering the current household
registration political and social situation. Even those rural migrants with agri-
cultural status may have already resided in urban for many years, they have to
choose move back in rural area in future because they are lack of ability to t the
increasing demand for human capital in cities. This is the urgent problem needed
to be solved in China's urbanization process.
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Figure 2.2: % of industrial and non-agricultural value-added in GDP, and urban-
ization rate in China
Source: The World Bank: from 1960-2009
Although China has the higher growth rate of urban population nowadays, the
growth rate and urbanization level has not coordinated with her economic devel-
opment yet. Generally, urbanization process must be consistent with industrial-
ization. In the early and middle stage of urbanization, industrialization is positive
with urbanization and its level is usually greater than urbanization level, but in
the ending stage of urbanization (urban population ratio greater than 0.8) just
opposite. Figure 6.1 shows trend of the urbanization level, share industrial and
non-agricultural value-added in GDP from 1960 to 2009. China's urbanization
level has always been lagging behind her industrial level. The share of the sec-
ondary and tertiary industries to the GDP and total employees is respectively
13.4% and 7.9%. The minority urban population contributes to the most of prod-
uct outputs while the majority rural population contributes less to total economic
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development. China's urbanization indeed lags his industrialization level and eco-
nomic development level.
Usually we use value of the Chenery-Syrquin's standard patterns of development
( [15]) to measure the relationship between industrialization and urbanization, as
shown in Table 2.2.2. The top half of the table shows the empirical value calculated
based on statistic data analysis of 101 countries by Chenery and Syrquin. The
industrial structure and employment allocation of labor force must correspond
with some level of urbanization. For instance, while the industry value-added
percentage of GDP is 33 and non-agricultural value-added percentage of GDP
is 75.9, it must have almost 20.6% employment ratio in industry and 53.6 % in
non-agricultural and require the urban population ratio is 43.9%. According to
this table, in 2008 the industry value-added percentage of GDP, non-agricultural
value-added percentage of GDP, the employment ratio in industry and in non-
agricultural in China are 48.6, 88.7, 27.2 and 60.4 respectively, thus the corre-
sponding urbanization level is almost 52.7 in 2008, but actually the urban popu-
lation is only 43.1. That fact shows that the urbanization in China is not enough
according to her higher economic growth.
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Table 2.2: Chenery - Syrquin's patterns of economic structure and development
Industry value Non-agricul- Employ- Employ-
added tural added ment in ment in Urbaniza- IU NU
(% in GDP) (% in GDP) industry non-agricul- tion rate ratio ratio
(%) tural(%)
21.0 56.4 9.1 35.8 22.0 0.41 1.63
28.7 69.5 16.4 46.5 36.2 0.45 1.28
33.0 75.9 20.6 53.6 43.9 0.47 1.22
36.1 80.0 23.5 59.0 49.0 0.48 1.20
38.3 82.7 25.8 63.5 52.7 0.49 1.20
42.9 87.7 30.3 73.3 60.1 0.5 1.22
44.9 89.6 32.5 78.2 63.4 0.51 1.23
48.8 91.0 36.8 87.8 65.8 0.56 1.33
China(2008)
48.6 88.7 27.2 60.4 43.1 0.63 1.4
* Source: Feng Bangyan, Ma Xing, Provincial Dierences in China's Urbaniza-
tion, Economic Survey, 2005. [31] and China Statistical Yearbook 2009.
** IU is the ratio of industrial employment to urbanization; NU is the ratio of
non-agricultural employment to urbanization
However, the Chenery-Syrquin's standard value has errors because it was calcu-
lated in 1960, especially it used the US$ in 1964 as the reference value. Adjusting
that standard value is cumbersome and often its value is also not accurate. There-
fore, the IU and NU ratio, the ratio of industrial and non-agricultural employment
to urbanization, is used to measure the relation between industrialization and ur-
banization instead of the traditional standard value. Generally, while the indus-
trialization, urbanization and non-agricultural development are coordinated, the
value of IU and NU ratio is almost 0.5 and 1.2 respectively. Again the value of
China in 2008 is 0.63, 1.4 and still has a deviation from the reference ratio value.
This proves that the urbanization in China is not consistent with the economic
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growth and development.
2.2.3 Slow human capital accumulation
Human capital has played a signicant role in the economic development and also
has an important eect on productivity growth. Even thought the nine-year com-
pulsory education system and expansion of higher education policy implemented
in 1999 have been increased the skill level of workers, the incentive to invest in
human capital still distorted by the restrictive household registration system and
the lagging urbanization.
Table 2.3: Education level of urban, rural and migration residents








Non-hukou migrant 10.3 24.2 52.2 13.3
Urban resident 6.5 13.5 35.9 44.1
Rural resident 19.2 38.2 36.9 5.7
Source: data from Fan, 2000 [30]; Table 10 (Liu et al, 2003 ) [94]
The education level between rural and urban residents still has big gap (Table
2.2.3). Only 5.7 percent of rural residents have the education above junior middle
school and 19.2 percent of them are still illiteracy. In the opposite, above 44
percent of urban residents have more than the high school degree and only 6.5
percent of them are illiteracy. Furthermore, the education level of non-hukou
rural-urban migrants is higher than of rural residents and lower than of urban
residents. It is believed that the migrants prefer to invest human capital than
rural population.
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The employed population in primary education occupied over half of total em-
ployed population in China. Despite the ratio of illiteracy and primary education
has been decreasing gradually, the proportion of higher education (has the sec-
ondary and tertiary degree) is still at the low level, only 6.8 percent in 2005.
Moreover, the education distribution of non-agricultural employed population is
not at expected value although the tertiary school enrollment rates increased from
less than 2% in 1990 to almost 17% in 2005 as the demand for higher skilled em-
ployee has been increasing (Figure 6.2 shows the increasing number of graduates
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Figure 2.3: The number of graduates from and entering students into tertiary
education in China
After 1999 tertiary education is mainly nanced by a child's family in China.
Tuition fees plus accommodation fees of college student exceeded 10000 yuan per
year in 2010. Since the annual income for rural residents is only 5919 yuan, and
the annual disposable income for urban residents is 19109 yuan, the cost of college
education becomes a heavy burden for families, especially for rural households.
Short of capital market to invest the tertiary education discourages the incentive
to attend college or university of children from low income family (Li and Xing,
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2010 [95]). The inuence of borrowing constraints on decisions to attend college as
tuition costs have risen is growing (Wang et al., 2007 [101]). Educational reforms
without concomitant capital market reforms or government subsidy for tertiary
education contributes to the increase in human capital inequality and impedes
rural-urban skill transformation.
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Figure 2.4: Gross domestic saving in China (% of GDP)
Source: The World Bank: from 1970-2009
China's savings is high. In 80's of the last century, the savings ratio was approxi-
mately 30% of its Gross Domestic Product. It had increased to 40% from 1990's,
and at present it remains at around 50%. Figure 6.3 shows the gross domestic
saving in China from 1970 to 2009. The ratio of national saving to GDP in China
has reached really high degree both in terms of historical gures and international
gures. It is a ratio of saving to total GDP around 50% in China comparing with
other country that the gross domestic saving ratio is almost 18% in the past 30
years in USA, UK and Brazil. South Korea has a higher saving ratio as well, but
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Figure 2.5: Rural and urban saving rates 1990-2008
Source:China Statistical Yearbook, NBS
Furthermore, the average saving rate has been rising over time and has reected
high savings rates in all three sectors - corporate, household and government and
the households' saving rate is higher than the other two sectors. We classify house-
holds into two groups, urban household and rural households to examine more
details about households saving behavior. The Figure 6.4 shows the household
saving rate as a proportion of household income over the period 1990-2008. The
urban household saving rate increases from 15% in 1990 to 29% in 2008, a rise of
14 percentage points. The nancial constraint may be the reasonable explanations
for this saving rate rising of urban household. Similarly, the rural saving rate also
increased from 15% to 23% over the same period. However, the change of saving
rate of rural households is more uctuate than of urban households. Moreover,
the rural saving rate was higher than urban saving rate over the period 1996-2005,
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deeply decreased from 2005 and then gradually increased and exceeded the urban
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Figure 2.6: Rural and urban income disparities 1990-2008
Source:China Statistical Yearbook, NBS
China's higher rural saving rate is challenge for our common sense. The poor rural
households save more than rich ones although their income per capita is only one-
third of urban households showed in Figure 6.5. Based on Freedman's permanent
income hypothesis, the households are seeking to smooth their lifetime consump-
tion and should borrow against future income when the economic growth and
income growth increase rapid in China. The high household saving rate in China
is reected by strict nancial borrowing constraint which incurs household have
to save more to support their requirement for subsistence, such as buy car, house
and health care insurance. But those cannot explain why saving rate between
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rural and urban is dierent.
The increasing income disparities between rural an urban and the extreme high
saving ratio are the biggest challenges for China's future economic development.
The spatial distribution of rural and urban labor force may be the reason to
explain this dierence saving behavior that most of rural people, who would like
to migrate into city to pursue the higher income, have to save more to nance their
migration cost and human capital accumulation. Human capital spillover plays a
key role in rural-urban migration (Lucas, 2004 [73]). Knowledge spillover in cities
attracts rural people out of rural land into urban areas by the means of borrowing
money from future to nance the human capital accumulation in cities. And this
urbanization process is inevitable and continuous until all labor force in rural
land transfer to urban producer. On the other hand, institutional barriers and
borrowing constraints are vital problems for rural households and delay migration.
When to move into cities? How to accumulate human capital?How to nd a job
to earn their living in urban? How to rent or buy house? Then migration is
dilemma for rural households with borrowing constraint. Therefore, saving is the
only choice for rural household with borrowing constraint who seek to migrate
into city.
Study on saving pattern is a rich research area in economics. Lots of theories and
hypothesis try to explain why the saving rate is so high and which factors can
inuence households' consumption and saving behavior.
Back to 1950's, Friedman (1957 [33]) proposed the permanent income hypothesis
that households would smooth their life-time consumption by borrowing money
from future high income if the income is expected to be high in future, especially
if real interest rates are low . According to this theory, the younger will at least
delay their savings, which is called demographic eects. But, Chamon and Prasad
(2010 [11]) shows that China's households saving rates have increased across all
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demographic groups, including those that can expect rapid income growth in the
future. They also nd that a U-shaped pattern of savings over the life cycle,
wherein the younger and older households have the highest savings rates, which
is opposite of the traditional hump-shaped prole of savings.
Christopher and David (2000 [17]) produced habit formation hypothesis in 1994
that the habit formation could rise up saving rates by restraining consumption
growth despite high income growth. Thus the decrease of public welfare, for
example high-level education, health insurance and housing services incur the mo-
tivation for savings. This hypothesis is good to explain why the younger and older
both have high saving rate: the younger households save for education expendi-
tures and house purchase and the older households save for health care. But there
is contradictory of contribution of housing and durables purchase for high saving
rate. Wang and Wen (2010 [102]) had given evidences to claim that the China's
high household saving rate cannot be explained by rising housing prices. Chamon
and Prasad (2010 [11]) agreed that the increasing saving rates is attributed by the
rapid privatization of the housing stock and rising housing price. Younger saves
more for buying his rst house and older saves more for changing new one. On
the other hand, the development of mortgage markets could alleviate the burden
of younger who desire to buy a house and reduce saving rate. However, those
theories still cannot capture the reason why the big dierence saving rate between
rural and urban.
The economic structure reform can change the households saving behavior (Nicola,
2008 [34]). Increasing uncertainties stemming from China's transition to a market
economy, such as enterprise restructures, could rise up the household's savings
.The high savings rates among young households may be driven by the need of
adequate buer stock of savings to smooth adverse shocks to their income. This
precautionary motive hypothesis can be explain the high saving rate in the devel-
oping countries with high economic growth, but it cannot be used to make clear
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the saving gap between rural and urban.
Barnett and Brooks (2010 [2]) nd that increasing of government health expendi-
ture is signicantly associated with the increase of urban households' consumptions
and the decrease of saving rate in China. However, the rural household's saving
has a positively relationship with government health expenditure. The reason is
that the increasing of government health expenditure could free up some essential
consumption for health care and let rural household save more.
In conclusion, above hypothesis are not appropriate to answer our questions why
the saving rate of rural households is more uctuate and higher than urban house-
holds in the long period. The model in previous part can shed light on the dierent
consumption and saving behavior between rural and urban population. Urban peo-
ple have not more demand of savings to invest human capital than rural people,
who are at the lower skill level, encounter borrowing constraint and institutional
barriers to accumulate human capital. Therefore the requirement for migrating
into urban and accumulating human capital may be the plausible and powerful
explanation for this saving puzzle in China.
2.2.5 Summary
In China, the rural-urban migration has been regulated and controlled by gov-
ernment policies especial the household registration system; the urbanization has
been lagging in compare with the level of industrialization and the high-speed
economic growth; knowledge and skill has been slowly transited in the period
of rural-urban migration; income disparities between rural and urban areas have
been still increasing and the saving rate is extremely high as well.
The previous model can be used as a unied framework to estimate those dif-
ferent problems and phenomena appeared in China's urbanization process from
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the point of view of human capital accumulation and skill transformation with
development of rural-urban migration. Typically, institutional policies and bor-
rowing constraint for rural people are the major barriers hindering the migration
from rural land to urban area, which may incur rural high saving rates and, slow
knowledge transformation and lagging urbanization.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
Urbanization is the key element in the process of economic growth and develop-
ment. Urbanization process is not simply the spatial relocation of population be-
tween rural and urban areas, but more importantly the skill transformation from
low-skilled to high-skilled workers. Many signicant works about this research
eld have been done. Many studies, in particular the endogenous rural-urban
migration model proposed by Lucas( [73]), demonstrate that human capital accu-
mulation and knowledge spillover play a crucial role in rural-urban migration and
economic development.
In the rst section of this chapter, literatures review the relationship between ur-
banization and knowledge spillover, especially the role of cities in the technology
progress, the skill transformation and the human capital accumulation. In the
second section of this chapter, it introduces theories about rural-urban migration
behavior and the determinants and consequences of the rural-urban migration pro-
cess. Three main rural-urban migration models have been illustrated, particularly
the Lucas' lifetime-learning rural-urban migration model.
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3.1 Urbanization and Knowledge Spillover
The technological development is the main source that leads the economic growth
and development. More than 20% of resources are devoted to learning and in-
novation (Jovanovic, 1997 [61]). Cities, where a large number of people live and
communicate, facilitate learning and interaction of ideas, and then attract a num-
ber of people concentrating in it. In this section, it reviews research works on the
relationship between urbanization and economic growth, and illustrates theoretic
channels of knowledge transfer and accumulation.
Urbanization and Growth
Economic growth is one of the most important and intrinsic research aspects for
economists. In terms of the law of diminishing marginal utility and constant return
to scale on physical capital and labor accumulation in neoclassical growth theory,
countries should converge to a steady state, which means nally those countries
can stop growing on some constant capital-to-labor ratio [97]. However, this theory
cannot adequately explain that most countries have been expanding their economy
gradually and achieve permanent growth rate in the real world. In1986 Romer
[84] introduced the increasing returns to scale in production function 1 to growth
theory and led neoclassical growth theory to a new age { New Endogenous Growth
Theory. In Romer's work, generation of ideas and accumulation of knowledge is
the key factor to encourage economic growth and development. The generation
and diusion of new ideas benet the creative innovator as well as entire human
welfare. Therefore, knowledge spillover can bring perpetual economic growth.
Based on Romer's work, Lucas [72] integrated modeling approach of growth theory
and human capital. Therefore he argues that not just "embodied knowledge", but
1In 1928, Young rst proposes this type of production [104]
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"disembodied knowledge" or human capital also contributed to economic growth.
Those two types of knowledge actually are complementary. People can learn more
from their talented schoolmates or higher-skilled colleagues. Therefore, combi-
nation of physical capital and human capital are the engine of economic growth
and development. Barro (1991 [3]) empirically showed the education which could
measure the human capital level is particularly important in determining growth.
Rauch [82] provided further empirical evidence to support the importance of skills
accumulation in economic progress, which was considering human capital spillover
as a standard urban amenity local and limited within city or regional area2. He
used wage and rent gradients to show how productivity was enhanced by living
near better educated people. Numbers of subsequent empirical studies conrmed
the importance of human capital accumulation in economic growth.
Another main nding in Lucas was the prominent role of cities for knowledge
transfer. Knowledge can easily be learned and acquired, and can quickly be dif-
fused and shared in urban environments. Cities are important and inescapable
to facilitate the diusion and accumulation of knowledge, and many people are
attracted to move out from rural land into cities. The benet of cities for human
capital accumulation is actually a motivation of rural-urban migration. Consid-
ering human capital spillover in cities, Henderson & Mitra (1996 [52]) and Black
(2003 [8]) constructed the rural-urban migration dynamic model linked urban-
ization and growth. The essential assumption of this model was that rural land
had not any contribution for human capital accumulation. This paper showed
some interesting relationship between urban structure and information connec-
tions. Moreover also demonstrated the technological advance is the major factor
to encourage the urbanization and growth. Instead of using embodied knowledge,
Helsley and Strange (2002 [48]) treated accumulation equation as a production
function for innovations and specialized inputs to justify why cities favor innova-
tion. In this case, further innovations were proportional to the quantity of past
2see Rosen, 1979 [85], or Roback, 1982 [83]
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innovations, namely, innovations had a public good property or had the human
capital spillover. Since cities to play an important role in the innovation process,
the spillover must be regional in scope and diminish with distance.
In summary, urbanization and economic growth are not parallel process and they
closely relate and promote each other.
Knowledge spillover in cities
As Marshall [77]said: \Great are the advantages which people following the same
skilled trade get from near neighborhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade
become no mysteries. . .", spatial proximity to individuals with greater skills or
knowledge allows ideas to ow more freely and facilitates the acquisition of skills
and the exchange and diusion of knowledge.
Jovanovic and Rob (1989 [63]), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995 [62]), and Glaeser
(1999 [38]) built a general framework to study the results of knowledge diusion
or transfer within cities. There have been the overlapping generations of risk-
neutral individuals who live for two periods: young in the rst period and old in
the second period of their life. Every worker is unskilled at birth, but can try
to become skilled when young, and if successful, can use those skills when old.
Cities play a core role in the acquisition of skills. At each period, each individual
chooses whether to live in the hinterland or to live in cities. And workers can only
become skilled after some successful face-to-face interactions with skilled workers.
Hence living in a city is a necessary condition to acquire skills. Moreover living in
the city with higher human capital level and a larger population can have better
learning opportunities. On the other hand, living in cities is more costly than
living in rural land.
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Knowledge spillover is helpful and essential to accumulate human capital. Accord-
ing to Romer [84] and Palivos and Wang (1996 [80]), nal producers encountered
constant returns to scale individually, but had increasing returns to scale aggre-
gately, and the nal output could be directly accumulated. Human capital and
labor are inputs for the homogeneous nal goods 3. Therefore, the externality
can be both of engines of growth and agglomeration force. Ioannides (1994 [54])
proposed Romer-type urban growth model, which assumed that nal goods could
be dierentiated and that each city might produce a dierent set of goods 4. Black
and Henderson in 1999 [7] used a slightly dierent specication for both the ur-
ban production externality and commuting costs in an economy with a growing
population. In their case, commuting costs become relatively less costly as human
capital accumulated and productivity increased, and then induces the increase
of the population of cities, and the population increase in turn stimulates fur-
ther growth. Hence, above all are not wholly "learning externality", instead of
production externality at city-levels.
Following Lucas' work [72], Eaton and Eckstein (1997) built an urban growth
model using dynamic externalities. In his model, cities oered no particular ad-
vantage in terms of the production of nal goods. Each employee in the city
faced constant returns and used his human capital to produce consumption goods.
Growth is driven by a human capital spillover in the city. This work will be spec-
ied later.
3more detail can be seen in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 [21]
4more detail can be seen in Henderson and Abdel-Rahman, 1991 [51]
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3.2 Rural-Urban Migration Models
Theories of Rural-Urban Migration
Migration is the fruitful research area for urban economics. Although migration
literature includes numbers of research respects, the main issues of it are the
determinants and consequences of migration. Traditionally, research on migration
tried to solve some questions: who want to migrate? Why do those people migrate?
Where are they moving out from and where are they moving in? When do they
decide to migrate? What are the consequences of the migration? (Greenwood,
1997 [44]).
This research mainly focuses on the migration from traditional agricultural rural
land to a modern industrialized urban area, and the transformation of a low-skilled
labor force to a high-skilled labor force.
Generally, four types of factors mainly inuence the act of migration (Lee, 1966
[69]): factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the area of
destination, intervening obstacles and personal factors (e.g. personal sensitivities,
intelligence and awareness of conditions). However, economic factors are the in-
trinsic factors which inuence people's decision whether migration to city or not,
assuming all human is rational and pursuing maximum prot. In other side, inter-
vening obstacles is another decisive negative factors to inuence personal decision,
because they can limit or delay migration.
Surplus of labor force in rural land, dierential of rural-urban wage rate and dier-
ential of rural-urban skills are those economic factors, which induce people move
out from rural areas to urban areas. In terms of modern economic growth and
economic development theory, human capital dierence and accumulation are the
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essential determinant of rural-urban migration. Marshall [77] mentioned the im-
portance of cities for spreading of innovations and ideas, and there indeed had
ideas and knowledge spillovers within the urban area (Chinitz, 1961 [16]). Follow-
ing, Sjaastad [96] considered the migration as an investment in human capital, and
Jacobs [56] pointed out that the diversity of urban stimulates to create innovative
ideas and innovate. Moreover, Lucas [72] suggested that the benets of cities for
learning also embodied the incremental skill and human capital accumulation fa-
cilitated the accumulation of knowledge spillover in the growth process. Proximity
to higher-skilled workers facilitates the acquisition of skills and the exchange and
diusion of knowledge (Jovanovic & Nyarko, 1995 [62]; Glaeser, 1999 [38]). Cities,
where a large number of people live and communicate, facilitate learning and are
the engine of the economic growth (Black and Hendenson, 1999 [7]).
In this section, it introduces some important and outstanding models about the
determinants of rural-urban migration.
Lewis' surplus labor force theory
Back to 1954, Lewis [70], in his most inuential published paper, "Economic de-
velopment with unlimited supplies of labor", explained the rural-urban migration,
which would not halt until urban wages equal rural income and thought the surplus
of labor forces in rural land was the factor to push farmer move into city. Later,
Fei and Ranis [81] formalized and perfected Lewis's theory. In this model, they
considered that whole economy consisted of two sectors, the traditional agricul-
tural sector and the capitalist industrial sector. The eventually marginal product
of labor in traditional agriculture becomes zero because of continual and constant
population increase. In respect that the wages in industry are higher than surplus
agricultural labor force transfer from rural to urban areas continuously until all
the surplus labor force in the traditional agricultural sector is absorbed into the
urban industrial sector. Under these conditions, the rural-urban migration and
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urban employment growth are encouraged by the reinforcement and the output
expansion in the industrial sector.
Harris and Todaro's lottery-game theory
Thus, what is the key factor to abstract farmer to the city even if they cannot
nd a job in urban? Harris and Todaro [46] believed the expected higher urban
income led rural-urban migration. They assumed that the marginal agricultural
product was always positive and inversely related to the extent of the rural labor
force and the migrating decision would be determined by the expected urban-rural
income dierential. In other word, they suggested the migrating decision was
dependent on "expected" rather than actual urban-rural real wage dierentials,
and furthermore the expected dierentials were determined by the interaction of
the actual urban-rural real wage dierentials and the probability of successfully
gaining jobs in the urban areas. The probability of getting a job in urban inversely
related to the urban unemployment rate. Thus, it is possible and rational that
migration rates exceeded urban job opportunity growth rate in the face of wide
urban-rural expected income dierentials. Consequently, the serious imbalance of
economic environment between urban and rural areas generally brings about high
unemployment rates in urban.
Harris-Todaro's migration model links the expected urban-rural wage dierential
and migration behavior. This model has a powerfully explanation for the rural-
urban migration in developing countries with higher urban unemployment, within
which the rural-urban dierential of the economic opportunity is enormous and
the strength to expand the industry is limited.
Regardless of the fact that pursuing expected urban-rural income dierential is
actually cause of rural-urban migration, above models still cannot capture how
those migrants nd a job and what the mechanism of the rural-urban migration
process.
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Eaton and Eckstein's migration model
Subsequently, Eaton and Eckstein in 1997 [26] pointed out that human capital
dierential was the motivation of migration, because the city was a good place to
obtain and accumulate human capital. Followed the idea that urbanization was
driven by the acquisition and accumulation of human capital5, they developed
the theory that the economic growth and urbanization consisted with parallel
growth, namely, cities with dierent sizes had the similar parallel urban growth
rate rather than the convergent growth rate with which all cities would converge
to an optimal city size or the divergent growth rate with which the gap between
the large city and small city would augment, that accorded with "rank-size rule".
Furthermore, they analyzed migration development between cities with dierent
relative levels of human capital to explain the relationship between urban growth
and distribution of human capital. They showed that there existed upper and
lower bound which guaranteed relative city size and removed any incentive to
migrate, otherwise employees in the lower human capital city had motivation to
migrate to the higher human capital city or reverse.
Based on their models, they proposed that the accumulating human capital for
fresh migrant was more eective rather than producing goods. Moreover, those
cities, where spend more time accumulating human capital, will have higher aver-
age human capital level, a higher salary rate, higher land rents and higher popu-
lation.
As above mentioned, pursuing higher wage and own human capital accumulation,
rural people move to city, so the low-skilled rural people would like to stay in
urban even if he cannot nd a job in city, because he believe that he nally can
get a proper job as long as his skill can catch up higher one with continuous
human capital accumulation in urban. That raises another crucial question how
the knowledge transfer to the new migrants in urban, and that is what Lucas [73]
5see: Uzawa,1965 [99] and Lucas, 1988 [72]
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did.
Benchmark Model { Lucas' migration model
Lucas(2004) [73] proposed a model to illustrate this rural-urban migration and
knowledge transition process. In his model, the entire economy includes two sec-
tors: traditional land-intensive rural land and modern human capital-intensive
urban area. In rural land, the human capital is no eect on productivity in agri-
culture and the single input of production is the employment force. In urban area,
production only uses a linear, labor-only technology and human capital accumu-
lation depends only on household's own time choice. Pursuing ecient human
capital accumulation and higher income based on human capital, people in rural
land would like to migrate to the city. However, if the city has not been an external
eect of human capital, this type of migration only occurs once and at beginning
time. Nonetheless, actually, we know the city has the human capital spillover.
Hence, this rural-urban migration is continuous over time with transferring of hu-
man capital from urban higher-skilled work to new low-skilled migrants. Recent
migrants' human capital accumulation path is not only determined by learning-
time choices but also the gap of the human capital level of rural and urban areas.
Meanwhile, spending full-time learning was more ecient for new migrants and
only high-skilled worker can nd a job and produce goods in urban. Therefore,
there only two types of people in urban: producer and a full-time learner, so
unemployment could be considered as one type of career.
Consequentially, according to Lucas' migration model, farm labor will ultimately
move to urban and the traditional agricultural labor force will nally reach zero.
The urbanization process is inevitable course and the traditional rural- modern
urban dual pattern will change to the monistic modern urban pattern6. Secondly,
6Obviously, although the rural land also exists, the production in rural land is not the tradi-
tional but modern agriculture with high-skill level
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external eects of human capital are very essential for the migration. The larger
the external eects are, the faster the migration process is. The higher external
eect encourages the migration rate from rural land to urban. Moreover, the new
migrant with low-skilled level has a catch-up eect. During his human capital
accumulation with full-time learning, he can obtain the higher growth rate than
the urban producer's growth rate in cities, not only because they spend all time
learning, but also because they can get the positive external eect of those who
migrated earlier or the high-skilled urban producers. Contemporary migrants keep
their higher human capital growth rate until their skill reaches urban-producer's
skill level. Ultimately, they will become an urban producer and get the same
human capital growth rate as skill-leaders.
The contribution of Lucas' model for migration theory has two aspects. First, his
model not only captures the determinant of rural-urban migration that human
capital spillover in cities encourages the inevitable rural-urban migration over
time, but also illustrates how the rural-urban migration does transit. His model
is the benchmark framework to study rural-urban migration process. Second, this
model explains the transfer from a dual economic structure to monistic economic
structure that can accomplish with the rural-urban migration. Consequently, the
rural-urban migration plays a signicant role in the economic growth and devel-
opment. The knowledge transfer from higher to lower workers accompanied by
rural-urban migration process as well.
Despite the fact that Lucas' model can explain rural-urban migration process, it
still leaves a window for further study. He assumed perfect capital market and no
moving cost in migration, namely, there was no any borrowing constraint for rural-
urban migration. It means that rural migrants can nance their life in the city
by borrowing their upcoming high income and they can spend full-time learning.
Nevertheless, it is not reasonable in reality. There have been many institutional
policies constraining rural-urban migration, such as household registration system,
CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 43
house policy, educational policy, personal loan policies etc. Therefore, recent
migrants are usually hard to invest their human capital accumulation in cities.
For example, the children of rural migrant with rural textquotedblleft HuKou"7
is rarely access to secondary school without any extra expenditure. Therefore, it
is readable to relax the perfect capital market assumption and import borrowing
constraint to this type of model.
7It is the permanent urban residence certicate
Chapter 4
Core Models
The proposed extending model is based on Lucas endogenous rural-urban migra-
tion model (Lucas, 2004 [73]). It follows the basic two sectors assumptions as
Lucas assumed. However, the dierence of two models is not only the extended
model incorporates the borrowing constraint for rural migrants, but also considers
the disparate initial situation of rural and urban population due to the strict lim-
itation of labor mobility between rural and urban areas in China. In addition, the
extended model can evaluate the inuence of institutional policies on rural-urban
migration process, skill transformation and social welfare.
44
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4.1 Foundation of models
The foundation of models is as same as Lucas described in his model (Lucas,
2004 [73]): two sectors and knowledge spillover in cities.
4.1.1 Two sectors
The whole economy only includes two sectors in the closed economy: rural sector
and urban sector, and only has one unit population to work for life. All labor
force has the innite lifetime. Therefore, the total labor force is constant and does
not grow over time. The only thing for people to choose in this economy is to
determine where they would like to reside in rural or urban. Each one can choose
move in or out of urban at any time in his life and does not need to pay any
migration cost, but must consider his preference problem and maximum it with











Where, c(t) is the consumption;  is the rate of time preferences;  is the magnitude
of the elasticity of marginal utility.
Since it can deeply inuence human capital accumulation and their lifetime income
and quality of life, people are cautions to choose whether they live and work.
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Rural sector
In rural sector, there is traditional land-intensive production technology. Every
household has one unit of non-leisure time spending on working, and human cap-
ital is no eect on productivity in traditional agriculture, and the only input of
production is employment force. Thus the production is assumed to be the Cobb-
Douglass production function:
F (x(t)) = Ax(t) (4.3)
Where, x(t) is the labor force in rural sector for any x 2 [0; 1]; A is the constant
value;  is the constant parameters while  2 (0; 1). The wage rate of farmers is
F 0(x(t)) at time t, and can be expressed by
F 0(x(t)) = Ax(t) (1 ) (4.4)
The wage rate or income of farmer is strictly increasing with decreasing of labor
force in rural sector with F 0(x(t)) > 0 at any time. Because less people can share
the same land resources as before, thus each one can get more prots after rural
labor force decreased.
Rural farmers do not invest any human capital with initial human level h0.
Urban sector
In urban sector the modern human capital-intensive technology is adopted. Hu-
man capital is signicant for urban production: the higher human capital or skill
is, the greater productivity is. Therefore we assume there is only one type of con-
sumption goods adopting a linear, labor-only technology, and the real wage rate
paid for workers is constant and normalized to be unity, thus the total output in
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urban is:
Y (t) = z(t)H(t)u(t) (4.5)
Where, z(t) is the number of labor force in urban for any z 2 [0; 1]. The H(t) is
the human capital of urban workers. In Lucas model, any one has the same initial
human capital level, thus H0 = h0. The u(t) is the time each labor force spends
on working.




= H(t)[1  u(t)] (4.6)
Where,  is a constant growth parameter. The u(t) belongs in [0; 1] and the [1 
u(t)] time is learning time, which contains the all knowledge-improving activities,
training and schooling as in Rosen's and Lucas' description.
Provided that benet for human capital accumulation in urban sector, urban area
is more attractive than rural land. It can predict that ultimately whole population
will locate in urban area for enjoying modernization. Hereby, urban producers'
maximize problem can be solved.














The Hamiltonian function is
Ha = e
R t
0 r(s)dsH(t)u(t) +   H(t) [1  u(t)] (4.8)
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Solving above Hamiltonian function we can obtain
  = e
R t
0 r(s)ds (4.9a)
_ =  [  u(t) +   (1  u(t))] =    (4.9b)
Dierentiating equation (4.9a) with respect to time yields
 _ = e
R t
0 r(s)ds ( r(t))
Substituting equation (4.9a) into above function we can easily derive following
equation
_ =  r(t) (4.10)
Combining with equation (4.9b), nally we get that formula
r(t) =  (4.11)
It means at equilibrium state the interest rate r(t) equals the constant value 
whatever the household's choice about time allocation is. Intrinsically, it is a
consequence of the linearity capital accumulation technology assumption.
In addition, earnings for producer in urban areas are his human capital level
multiplies the working time u(t) (the real wage rate is assumed to be unit), so the
earnings at any date  later than t,  > t with initial value H0 are








Therefore, the present value of lifetime earnings at time t can be writtend by
PV (t) = H0
Z 1
t














u(s) ds = +1





In equilibrium state, the present value of the urban economy must be equal. Equa-
tion equation (4.13) shows that whatever the time allocated between working and
learning, the present value of urban household with same initial human capital
value H0 has the idetial value. It is due to the same linear technology assumption
for both production and learning in urban areas.
Second, the household also choose his consumption to maximum his preference for











0 r(s) ds c(t) dt  k
Where the k is the sum of the value of lifetime income of urban workers.











0 r(s) ds c(t)
with  (0) = 0 and  (1)   k . Now, we can construct the following Hamiltonian
function
Ha = e tU(c(t))   e 
R t
0 r(s) ds c(t)
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Dierentiating above equation with respect to c(t), and get







And  is the constant value in this case. So at time t = 0, have
U 0(c(0)) = 
Thus, the rst-order condition is








According the assumption about utility function get
U 0(c(t)) = c(t) 








Hence, the consumption growth rate is the function of interest rate r(t). As as-
suming only one input and the linear production technology, the human capital
accumulation growth rate must equal the consumption growth rate at the com-
petitive equilibrium. From equation (4.11) get r(t) = .










Therefore the u(t) at the equilibrium state is constant
u = 1      

(4.17)
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and parameters should satisfy the following inequality to guarantee the u(t) be-
longs to [0,1].
       0 (4.18)
Summarized, in the urban economy, the human capital accumulation and con-
sumption has the same constant growth rate at equilibrium state, and the working
time of urban producer ultimately can converge to a constant value.
Without loss of generality, we simply assume that urban producers are at their
equilibrium state, at which they have the same initial human capital level H0 with
the same maximum time location between working and learning.
H(t) = H0 e
t;  = (1  u) (4.19)
4.1.2 Eect of knowledge spillover in the city
In this section, it species the details of Lucas' migration model considering knowl-
edge spillover in city, which are the essential bridge to link this research. Rural
people would like to migrate to urban as soon as possible on the benet of the
external eect of human capital in the city when the perfect capital market as-
sumption holds and the interest rate is constant over time, as Lucas described.
Each new migrant from rural land has the same initial skill h0 and identical initial
wealth. The human capital level h(s; t) of the new migrant at date t, who migrated







h(s; t)[1  u(s; t)] (4.20)
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where H(t) is urban producer's human capital, and it also has the same accumu-
lation path as assumed before
dH(t)
dt
= H(t)[1  u(t)] (4.21)
The parameter  is used to measure the external eect of human capital in the
city. The  = 1 is the case Eaton and Eckstein studied that cities can have a
parallel growth paths without rural sectors. The  = 0 is the case Lucas de-
scribed that the migration only occurs once at beginning migration time, because
in this case there is no knowledge spillover in the city attracting people moving
out of rural land. Hereby, from above expressions, the bigger  speeds up human
capital accumulation of low-skilled rural migrants and accelerate the rural-urban
migration.













h(s; t)[1  u(s; t)]
h(s; s) = h0




h1 (1  u)] + !H(h;H)H 0(t) (4.23)
The rst-order condition can be obtained with respect to u, and then derive u = 0.
By this, Lucas [73] proved that the full-time learning allocation was the optimal
choice for new low-skilled migrants.
While his skill level is less than the highest skill level H(t) in the city, he like to
spend whole time learning, then the leader with human capital level H(t) is the
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only urban producer in equilibrium. Therefore, only two types of city residents:
producers and full-time learners with the external eect of human capital in this
situation.
The equation (4.20) can be rewritten by
@h(s; t)
@t
= H(T )h(s; t)1  (4.24)
Let z(t) still be the number of producers at date t in urban area, the goods
market-clearing condition of the whole economy is
C(t) = F (x(t)) + Y (t) = F (x(t)) + z(t)H(t)u(t) (4.25)
Combining equation (4.21) and (4.24), this dierential equation can be solved with
the initial condition h(s; s) = h0.
Let T (s) represent the catch-up time of rural migrant, who move into urban at




h(s; u) du = [H(T (s)] (4.26)
and easily derive that:
z(T (t)) = 1  x(t) (4.27)
At time T (t), all migrants, who move into city at time t, have nished knowledge
transfer and become urban producer.
According to formula (4.26), the dierential function of catch-up time T (t) can be
derived. Dene the function of 	(T (t); t) as:
	(T (t); t)  h0 + 
Z T (t)
t
h(s; u) du  [H(T (t))] = 0 (4.28)
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And dierentiating it with respect to T (t)
@	(T; t)
@T




Because the H 0(T )=H(T ) = (1 u(T )), the above equation is always greater than
0, which means at most one T (t) can be solved (4.28) for each t. it is obviously
that T (0) = 0 and H(0) = H0. Since 	(T (t); t) ! 1 as T (t) ! 1, the solution
always exists when T (t) > t; and t > 0. The dierential equation of catch-up time











For whole economy including urban and rural areas, the goods market should be
clear and the present value is same for both of people in the city or in the rural land
(no moving cost for people here). Without borrowing constraints and migration
cost, the maximum lifetime utility problem is as same as the maximum lifetime
present value problem. Thus the present value equation of people, who migrates
at date t and catch up at date T (t) is written by
Z 1
t




Based on above, the new migrant produces only if he catch up with the leaders in
urban area, thus right side of the equation (4.30) can be rewritten by
Z 1
t
e (s t)F 0(x(s)) ds  e [T (t) t]H(T (t))

(4.31)
Dierentiating above equation with respect to time yields the formula
F 0(x(t)) = e [T (t) t][H(T (t))]1 [H(t)] (4.32)
1The \> "is hold only for x0(t) = 0.
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This is equilibrium equation can be used to obtain the rural-urban migration curve
without borrowing constraints, motivated by the human capital spillover in the
city, described by Lucas in 2004 [73].
4.2 Transition with borrowing constraint
4.2.1 Rural-urban migration barriers
In China, the rural-urban population movement is not free which controlled by
local government because of protecting the right of urban residents and avoiding
overcrowding. Due to the barriers between rural and urban labor mobility, poten-
tial migrants cannot choose the migration time by him. Urbanization is inevitable
process in economic development of developing countries, thus rural-urban labor
ultimately will be permitted free movement between rural and urban areas at a
time. However this time not only depends on the urban economic develop status
but also on the local urban government decision.
Based on above Lucas rural-urban migration framework, there have been three
cases for unrestricted migration time of dierent developing countries.
(1) There is not any barrier of rural-urban population movement, which is the
Lucas case. The initial rural and urban labor distribution is determined by
preliminary rural productivity and initial human capital level. The migration
time is based on the rate of urban human capital accumulation and the level
of human capital spillover in the city.
(2) Initially rural-urban migration was prohibited, and then would be permitted
by the government without any regulations as well as migrants can borrow
money from the high future income to nance their current migration pro-
cess and human capital accumulation. In this case, some rural people, who
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have been willing to move into urban initially but not allowed, immediately
migrates to cities when labor mobility between rural and urban is free. Moti-
vated by the dierent human capital between rural and urban areas and the
level of human capital spillover in cities, the left rural people will gradually
migrate to cities.
(3) Initially rural-urban migration was forbidden, but would be permitted with
borrowing constraints. Consequently, while the barrier of rural-urban labor
mobility is broken, many rural people with borrowing constraints have to
delay their migration until they save enough money to support their human
capital accumulation in cities.
4.2.2 Borrowing constraints and migration time
In the real world, rural potential migrants not only easily move into the city, but
also cannot borrow money from the high future income to smooth their lifetime
consumption because they often have the high degree of mobility and cannot use
any land as collateral. For supporting living in urban areas during skill transition
period, migrants with borrowing constraint have to save enough money while they
work in the rural land. Consequently, rural potential migrants with borrowing
constraints have to postpone their migration time, which aects their consumption
and saving choice comparing with those without borrowing constraints, who can
borrow money from the high future income to smooth the lifetime consumption.
Following Lucas' rural-urban migration model assumptions, full-time learning for
migrants is the best eective choice than working in urban areas. Rural migrants
choose their consumption level to determine when migration to the city as well as
to maximize their lifetime utility. Although borrowing constraints cannot directly
aect lifetime present value of rural-urban migrants, but they profoundly inuence
their lifetime utility value. Without borrowing constraint, migrants can smooth
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the lifetime utility according to the lifetime income. Thus, maximum lifetime
utility value is same as the maximum lifetime present value. However, distinct from
the case without borrowing constraint, rural migrants with borrowing constraint
cannot smooth their lifetime utility and have to maximum two segmented utility
phases before and after becoming an urban producer.
The full-time learning migrants with initial human capital h0 follow the same
human capital accumulation path as Lucas model described
@h(s; t)
@t
=  H(t) h(s; t)1  (4.33)
where s is the migration time.
Household's preferences
The maximum preference problem of rural migrants with borrowing constraint
is dierent from above Lucas' rural-urban migration case, because they cannot
smooth their lifetime consumption. Now the lifetime consumption is segmental,
C(t) = C1(t)+C2(t), where C1(t) follows consumption path during rural life time
plus skill transition period in urban areas and C2(t) follows consumption path as



















r(u) du) c2(t) dt  pv2
c0; cT and TV C conditions
(4.35)
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Where the c1(t) is the current consumption at time t, t 2 [0; T ) and c2(t) is the
current consumption at time t, t 2 [T;1). The pv1 is the total income and wealth
during his rural life time and skill transition period in urban areas; the pv2 is the
total income and wealth after he becomes a urban producer.
Adopting same treatment as above section described, using the Hamiltonian equa-
tion, the rst-order condition can be solved and obtaind
8>><>>:
U 0(c1(t)) = U 0(c(0)) exp[t 
R t
0
r(u) du]; t 2 [0; T );
U 0(c2(t)) = U 0(c(T )) exp[t 
R t
0
r(u) du]; t 2 [T;1):




[( )=] t; t 2 [0; T ) and c1 = c(0);
= c2 e
[( )=] t; t 2 [T;1 and c2 = c(T )):
(4.36)
Consequently, the household's consumption path is the segmental exponential
functions with the same growth rate ( )=(= ) in the equilibrium state. How-
ever, those two segmental parts have a dierent initial value, which represents the
dierent living level in rural or in urban areas, respectively. In other words, it
means that the consumption level of rural migrant has an upward jump and then
sustains the higher level based on his higher human capital level when the human
skill of rural migrant keeps up with the level of urban producers. Comparing with
Lucas' case, the initial consumption must be lower than that one, because bor-
rowing constraint changes the rural households' consumption and saving pattern.
The jumping consumption level at time T is linked to the income level at that
time. Thus, the following equations for the rst rural migrants with borrowing
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constraint can be obtained:8>><>>:
R T (s)
0










Solving above equations, the segmented consumptions path at the start migration
time s is 8>><>>:
c1 =
   














1  = ln c(t) (4.39)
for simplicity let  = 1.
Therefore, the lifetime utility value equals




e t ln c1et dt+
Z 1
T (s)







)(1  e T (s))  T (s)
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In addition, migrants without borrowing constraint can smooth lifetime utility
value and choose the unique initial consumption level c0(s) at migration time s,
which can be written by
c0 = (   )  PV = h0 u(1  e rs) +H0 ue (r )T (s) (4.41)
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Figure 4.1: Lifetime utility value with dierent start migration time
The dierence of lifetime utility value with and without the borrowing constraint
at the dierent start migration value is shown in Figure 4.1. Comparing the
utility value with borrowing constraint and without borrowing constraint, the
utility value with borrowing constraint is always not greater than the one without
borrowing constraint, and the peak value also has been got later than the one
without borrowing constraint.
Proposition 1 (The eect of borrowing constraint on lifetime utility). [1] if   
  0,  + > 0 and equation (4.17) and (4.19) hold, the borrowing constraint
is binding. [2] When borrowing constraint is binding, the initial consumption level
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of the rst rural migrants is lower, and the lifetime utility value is lower as well.
[3] The loss in lifetime utility is bigger in the presence of the borrowing constraint
when  is bigger.
The proof is in the appendix.
Labor force migration process
When the start migration time is determined, the rural people will gradually
migrate to the city. The migration population must comply with the equilibrium
condition that the following migrants have the same lifetime utility value as the
rst migration populations.
V (t)  V (s); while t  s (4.43)
Now, migration population path can be calculated based on above equations.
Thus, the discrete dierentiable function x(t) is calculated via the certain utility
function V(t), production function H(t) and F(x).
x(t) = G 1(Vt(F (x); H(t); C(t))) = G 1(Vs(F (x); H(t); C(t))) (4.44)
And the urban producer still hold the following path z(T (t)) = 1  x(t).
As this labor force migration function is dicult to get the compact analytic
solutions in this backward looking dynamic system .The computational analysis
will be in the next chapter.
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4.2.3 Equilibrium state with borrowing constraint
This part summarizes the equilibrium state in the whole economy only including
urban and rural sector with borrowing constraint.
The goods market should be clear, at time t it can be written by
C(t) + S(t) = F (x(t)) + z(t)H(t)u(t) (4.45)
The lifetime utility value must be same for every rural migrants. Therefore the
utility equation of people, who migrates at date s and catch up at date T (s)
satisfy equation (4.40). Based on the above description, we are ready to dene
the equilibrium.
Denition: An equilibrium is a set of functionsf c(t), u(t), h(t), H(t), z(t),
T(t), x(t)g on R+ and fh(s,t)g on R+ R+, such that
(i) u(t) 2 [0; 1] for all t > 0 at any time t.
(ii) There have positive value of c0, c1, c2 and x0 which satisfy the equilibrium
conditions.
(iii) x(t) is a function with x(t) 2 [0; 1] and satises the equation (4.44) for all
t > 0. x(0) = x0 and F
0(x0) = h0.
(iv) Urban producers' human capital path satises equation (4.21), and H(0) =
H0.
(v) New migrants' human capital path satises equation (4.33), and h(s; s) = h0.
(vi) The number of urban producers z(t) satises equation (4.27) for all t > 0.
(vii) The catch-up time function T (t) satises equation (4.29) for all t > 0 and
T (t) > t.
CHAPTER 4. CORE MODELS 63
(viii) The c(t) is always positive while equations (4.36) hold for all t > 0. And
conditions must be satised:
c1 < F
0(x0); and c2  c1 e[ ( )=]T (t)
(ix) The savings of rural migrants with borrowing constraint during rural living
period must be positive and must be exhausted in the end of skill transition
period in cities.
4.3 Policy inuence and social welfare
4.3.1 Migration tax
Once rural migrant successfully move into the city and become an urban producer
he will obtain the extra lifetime present value by means of investment on his
human capital comparing with rural farmer who does not choose to migrate to the
city. This is because he spends less time achieving high human capital level that
urban producers need to spend more time. Consequently, local city government
usually does not allow the rural migrants move into the city without any migration
charge. Therefore, in reality, especially in China, rural migrants often spend extra
expenditure and then can be permitted living in urban areas. On the other side,
this type of migration charge cannot be greater than the total value of extra
lifetime present value obtained by rural migrant; otherwise, nobody would like
migrating to the city.
We assume that PV is the dierence value of lifetime present value between mi-
grant and farmer, and  measures the extent of the rural-urban migration charge.
And
PV = PV   PVm (4.46)
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Proposition 2 (The eect of migration tax on lifetime utility). The utility value
Vm is always smaller than V. In addition, (Vm)
, the utility value at d(Vm)=dtVm =
0, and (V ), the utility value at d(V )=dtV = 0, must satisfy the following condi-
tions:
(Vm)








The proof is in the appendix.
4.3.2 Self-nance via government subsidy
The rural migrants with borrowing constraint not only have to delay their migra-
tion time, but also have the less lifetime utility value than those without borrowing
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constraint. Consequently, it causes the social welfare loss. The best way to stop
this social welfare loss is to open the credit market to rural potential migrants,
but it is hard to operate and implement because the high degree of mobility and
inability to use any land back home as collateral of rural people. Other exer-
cisable choice for government is to subside those rural migrants' human capital
accumulation in the city via their future income tax.
Let  represent the income tax rate of the migrants when they become urban
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Implicative assumption behind the government subsidy policy is that no reap
without sowing exists. Rural people, who apply for this government subsidy, can
deny to pay back it by no migration to the city or no investment in the human
capital accumulation. Therefore, the following function must hold:
c1 e
T (s)  c2 (4.53)
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Where T(s) is the catch-up time. Solving it and obtaining the value range of 
  (1  h0
H0
)   (e (r )T (s)   e rs) (4.54)
Let   represent the value of upper bound of  , so
  = G (s; T (s); h0; H0; ; ; ; ) = (1  h0
H0
)   (e (r )T (s)   e rs) (4.55)
Proposition 3 (The eect of government subsidy on lifetime utility). If 0   
 , where   satises the equation (4.55) and greater than 0, then the utility value
Vs is greater than V. (Vs)
, the utility value at d(VS)=dtVs = 0, and (V )
, the utility
value at d(V )=dtV = 0, must satisfy following equations
(Vs)












The backward-looking methodology can be used to solve the dynamic system
mentioned in the previous chapter. Firstly, we treat the employment force function
in rural land x(t) is given with initial value x(0) = x0 and satises the equilibrium
condition (iii), as Lucas did in 2004.
Before doing that, the value of parameters (Table 5.1) must be dened and calcu-
lated. Following the settings of Lucas in 2004, the net return on physical capital
is almost 0.1 (r = 0:1), the coecient of risk aversion is usually around 1 ( = 1),
the time preference value  equals 0.08, and he parameter  equals the return
rate r shown in above chapter. Therefore the per capita income growth rate 
is around 0.02 annually ( = (   )= = 0:02) and the optimal working time of
urban producer u is 0.8 (u = 1  (delta  )=).
The rural production adopts Cobb-Douglas technology, where  = 0:65 (John-
son,1948 [60]). The value of parameters A and h0 are depending on the rural
labor inputs and total outputs, thus there have lots of value pairs to satisfy the
67
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Table 5.1: The value of parameters
Name Meaning Value Area
x0 Initial rural labor force 0.7
h0 Initial rural human capital 0.65
H0 Initial urban human capital 1.2
 Output elasticities of labor 0.65
A Total factor productivity A = h0=(x
 1
0 )
 Coecient of time preference 0.08
 Coecient of risk aversion 1
r Return on physical capital 0.1
 Coecient of human capital accumulation  = r
u Working time of urban producer u = 1   

 Growth rate of H accumulation  = (1  u)
 External eect of human capital [0,1]
 Magnitude of migration tax (0,1)
 Extent of government subsidy (0, )
rural production function. Following Lucas' setting about A (Lucas, 2004 [73]),
the value of parameter A still equals 0.8826 and then the h0 can be solved to be
0.65, while F 0(x0) = h0 and x0 = 0:7. The initial human capital of urban producer
H0 equals 1.2, because we assume that the income of urban producers 1.2 times
the income of rural farmers.
By using the maximum of lifetime utility value and marginal conditions of rural
production, the migration path can be obtained. Based on above models and
parameters setting, we can map H, h, T and V to derive the curve of F 0(x(t)) and
then get the migration path of x(t).
Specic practices are as follows:
Step 1: Locate rst migration time.
As all people are rational, the earliest migrants with borrowing constraints will
choose to migrate to cities at the time when they can achieve the maximum lifetime
utility value, ceteris paribus. The rst migration time and the corresponding
maximum lifetime utility value vary with the change of knowledge spillover in
cities, severity of migration tax and degree of income transfer by government
CHAPTER 5. NUMERICAL STUDY 69
policy.
Step 2: Calculate catch-up time after the start migration time.
Since the start migration time is conrmed, the catch-up time is determined by
the dierence of human capital level between urban and rural areas H(t)   h(t),
knowledge spillover level , human capital accumulation speed coecient  and
the start migration time s.
There is an implicit condition of migrant's catch-up time that the human capital
catch-up time should be longer than T , the approximate value of learning time
in the city.
T = T (s)  s  H0   h0

(5.1)
Step 3: Calculate simulative real-time rural labor forces.
With the same maximum value of lifetime utility, following migrants will choose
the dierent migration time based on their distinctive consumption behavior. If
they prefer instant consumption, rural farmers will migrate later. When the max-
imum utility value V , start migration time s and catch-up time T(s) are deter-
mined. PV(t), the present value of migrants in rural area at time t is calculated.
And x(t), rural labor forces at time t (t  s) is obtained because the rural income
is only inuenced by labor inputs. Consequently, the rural-urban migration curve
can be captured.
There has an operator to make sure the value of x0(t) is strictly negative since rst
rural households have been migrated to an urban area. The reason is that there
is no waste of human capital investment in this economic system, in other word
if migrant moves into city and begin to invest in his human capital, he will not
choose to move back rural land to avoid losses of his human capital investment.
Therefore, rural people are cautious of the migration decision.
Let x^(t) is the numerical solution of this discrete curve (4.44), thus x(t), the
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realistic solution of migration function, is dened by
x(t) =
8>><>>:
x^(t  1); while x^0(t  1) < 0 and x^(t)0 > 0;
x^(t); while x^0(t  1) < 0 and x^(t)0 < 0
(5.2)
5.2 Eect of borrowing constraint
Migration time and labor force relocation




























Figure 5.1: Lifetime utility value with and without borrowing constraint
( = 0:8,  = 0,  = 0)
First, beginning migration time needs to be determined. According to this model,
rural people with borrowing constraint choose the time at which they can have the
maximum value of lifetime utility, and that is distinguished from Lucas (2004).
On the one hand, with borrowing constraint migration happens in that time when
migrant can achieve the maximum of lifetime value which is dier from lifetime
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present value; on the other hand, without borrowing constraint there is no dif-
ference between achieving the maximum lifetime present value and the maximum
lifetime utility. Therefore Lucas(2004) has been focused on the maximum lifetime
present value instead of lifetime utility.
Figure 5.1 shows the curves of lifetime utility value at dierent migration time.
Without borrowing constraint, the maximum value of lifetime utility is 5.5 years.
In the opposite, with borrowing constraint the migration time is 13.6 years. Fur-
thermore, the maximum value of lifetime utility with borrowing constraint is lower
than the one without borrowing constraint. Therefore, borrowing constraint in-
curs the loss of migrant's welfare because the migrant cannot choose the migration
time at which he can achieve the maximum value of lifetime present value.























Rural labor force without borrowing constraint
Urbanl labor force without borrowing constraint
Rural labor force with borrowing constraint
Urban labor force with borrowing constraint
Figure 5.2: Labor force allocation curve with and without borrowing constraint
( = 0:8,  = 0,  = 0)
The spatial relocation pathes of labor force in the whole economy with borrowing
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constraint are shown in Figure 5.2. In the initial state, the number of farmers
is greater than the number of urban producers. When farmers begin to migrate,
the rural employment immediately starts to reduce, but the number of urban pro-
ducers does not add up instantly because those new migrants cannot get a formal
job until they can catch up with the skill level of urban producers. According
to the models, the labor force path in rural land includes three stages. In the
rst stage, rural households cannot choose to migrate into the city because they
cannot aord the living cost in urban areas with borrowing constraint. However,
they understand that once move into urban they will get extra benets for the
positive external eect of human capital in cities. Rural migrants have to reduce
their consumption and save money for preparing to migrate in the future. Once
they get the maximum value of lifetime utility, rural households will decide to
move into the city and begin to accumulate their human capital. From that time,
the labor force in rural land starts gradually decreasing over time. Once migrants
have nished human capital accumulation and catch up with urban producer, they
enter into the last stage. From that time, the labor force in the urban area begins
continuous increasing until reaches of the unit one.
It is clear that borrowing constraint postpones the rural-urban migration time and
the rural-urban labor force transition as well.
Eect of knowledge spillover
Borrowing constraint inuences lifetime utility value and whole migration process.
Meantime, human capital spillover  still profoundly aects the migration process
via their inuence on the human capital accumulation of migrants and lifetime
utility value.
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Figure 5.3: Lifetime utility value with dierent external eect of human capital





















theta = 0.8 theta  = 0.5 theta = 0.3
Figure 5.4: Labor force relocation with dierent external eect of human capital
The eect of human capital spillover in cities is presented in Figure 5.3. As
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discussed in the previous chapter, with higher value of , migrants can choose
earlier migrating time and achieve the higher lifetime utility value. The initial
migration time is 13.6 years at  = 0:8, in the opposite that time will delay to 54
years if  = 0:3. Migrant is very sensitive to the change of external level of human
capital in urban. 1 percent change of  value postpones 0.8 year of migration time
on average. Therefore, city with the higher external eect of human capital is more
attractable for rural people. Furthermore, the altered migration path showed in
Figure 5.4. The urbanization level is also inuenced by human capital spillover in
cities. If  = 0:3, only 14.3 percent of the rural labor force decrease distinctly and
then the rural to urban movement is very slow because there is no more benet
from human capital investment for rural people at that level of human capital
spillover in cities.
5.3 Eect of government policies
Migration tax charged by local city government
In reality, local city government charges migration tax for rural migrants. The
reason is that the migrant can spend less time completing his human capital ac-
cumulation and pull up to the human capital level of urban producers. Local
city government would like sharing the extra benets from the catch-up eect of
migrants. While  = 1, city government can possess the whole extra benet of
migrants, on the contrary while  = 0 migrants can hold all the benet from their
human capital investment.
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 illustrate lifetime utility value and migration path with
dierent value of , respectively. The higher value of  is, the lower maximum
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Migration tax = 0.1
Migration tax = 0.3
Migration tax = 0.6
Migration tax =  0
Figure 5.5: Lifetime utility value with dierent value of  ( = 0:8)
value of lifetime utility is. If local government shares 60 percent of the extra bene-
ts, beginning migration time will delay about 13.3 years and the maximum value
of lifetime utility will reduce 20 percent compared with the case that migrant with
borrowing constraint holds all his extra benets.
Table 5.2: Migration time and individual lifetime utility response to 
Value
of 
Migration time Lifetime utility
w/o cosn. with cons. w/o cosn.t with cons.
 = 0 5.5 13.6 -3.37 -4.16
 = 0:1 5.5 14.6 -3.52 -4.32
 = 0:3 5.5 17.5 -3.64 -4.61
 = 0:6 5.5 26.9 -3.85 -4.95
Notes: the w/o cosn. means without borrowing constraint and the with cons.
means with borrowing constraint.
The value of  = 0:8
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In the other side, migration tax charged by local city government amplies the neg-
ative eect of the borrowing constraint on rural-urban migration process. Without
borrowing constraint, since migrant can smooth his lifetime utility value, the ef-
fect of migration tax can transfer for both before and after becoming an urban
producer period. However, with the borrowing constraint, this migration tax
only gives pressure on the period before becoming an urban producer. Table 4.2
demonstrates the dierent migration time and lifetime utility value with and with-
out borrowing constraint in response to a dierent value of . Charging people
for migration cannot alter the migration time without borrowing constraint, but
profoundly changes the migration time with borrowing constraint. Moreover, the
ratio of utility value without borrowing constraint to with borrowing constraint
decreases with respect to the rise of migration tax. It means that adding the
share of extra benets in urban areas will adjourn rural-urban migration and ex-
acerbate the human capital accumulation despite of without borrowing constraint.





















Migration tax = 0.1
Migration tax = 0.3
Migration tax = 0.6
Migration tax =  0
Figure 5.6: Labor force relocation with dierent value of  ( = 0:8)
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Self-nance via government subsidy























tau  =  0.03
tau  =  0.05
tau  =  0.08
Figure 5.7: Lifetime utility value with dierent income tax
In this section, we will analyse the case considering government subsidy policies.
As described in previous section, we can easily calculate the dierent lifetime util-
ity value with dierent future income tax  , showed in Figure 5.7. Government
subsidy is one type of tool which can provide an income transfer channel for mi-
grants to alleviate the negative eect of the borrowing constraint on rural-urban
migration. While  = 0:08, the migration time is 2.3 years ahead. This result is
coincident with the predictions of this model. More government subsidy is, harrier
the rural-urban migration process is, see in Figure 5.8. Furthermore, when  lim to
its upper value, there is no any eect of borrowing constraint since the government
provides the most subsidy for migrants who are close to the consumption path as
same as the one without borrowing constraint. Thus, the best choice of migration
time is close to 5.5 years as same as the case without borrowing constraint. Mean-
while, if the government subside the rural-urban migration, the social welfare loss
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will decrease and the growth rate of urbanization process will speed up.





















tau  = 0.03
tau  = 0.05
tau  = 0.08
Figure 5.8: Lifetime utility value with dierent income tax
Therefore if borrowing constraint is not easily eliminated, the central government
can choose the subsidy for a migrant to encourage rural-urban migration and speed
up the skill transformation.
5.4 Consumption and saving patterns
This model guarantees each following migrants have the same utility value as the
rst migrant, but dierent lifetime present value. Therefore, migrants want to
migrate earlier must sacrice more consumption and those who want to enjoy im-
mediate consumption will migrate later. The dierent initial consumption level at
the dierent migration time is shown in Figure 5.9. This curve is congruent with
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predictions of the model discussed in this thesis.





























Initial consumpiton level of migrants who move into
cities at the different time
The start migration time
Figure 5.9: Initial consumption level with dierent migration time
Figure 5.10 shows the characteristic lifetime consumption path for ve dierent
cases: no migration; without borrowing constraint; with borrowing constraint;
with borrowing constraint and migration tax; with borrowing constraint and gov-
ernment subsidy. No migration means no rural people would like moving into
the city as the external level of human capital in an urban area is extremely low
and close to zero. Without borrowing constraint, migrant can have a higher con-
sumption level since he can borrow money from the high future income to smooth
lifetime utility. Migrants with borrowing constraint have the lower consumption
level because the segmented consumption path compels him to save money to -
nance his own human capital investment. As the negative inuence of borrowing
constraint is amplied by migration tax, the consumption level of migrant lower
than both the one with and without borrowing constraint. Once migrant can get
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government subsidies, his consumption level will increase and achieve the same
value of migrant without borrowing constraint if he can get the full completed
subsidy.
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Figure 5.10: Consumption patterns with dierent cases
On the one hand, rural household without borrowing constraint has the higher con-
sumption level than their income in rural land because they can expect the future
higher income and borrow money from the future to invest in his human capital.
Thus migrant without borrowing constraint has the negative savings while they
are working in rural land and accumulating his human capital during the transi-
tion period in urban areas. On the other hand, migrant with borrowing constraint
has to exhaust his total savings until he catches up with the high-skilled urban
producer. According to the innite lifetime assumption that migrant will consume
whatever he earns, migrants with borrowing constraint have no any savings once
they become urban producers. As a result, we have the dierent solutions of s to
corresponding the dierent situation of borrowing constraint.
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Figure 5.11: Saving patterns with dierent cases
( = 0:8,  = 0,  = 0)
Aggregate saving rate of rural people with and without borrowing constraint is pre-
sented in Figure 5.11. As predictions of the model, without borrowing constraint
and higher external eect of human capital in urban, rural population borrow
money from the high future income to pursue the maximum lifetime utility level.
So the aggregate saving rate of rural people always less than 0 because everyone
expects high income once they move into urban and become urban producer by
completing their human capital accumulation. During the transition period from
5.5 to 11.8 year aggregate saving rate plunges since rst migrants start moving into
the city to accumulate human capital without any income. After rst migrants
nished skill transformation and became urban producer, the trend of saving rate
has been slowly risen up by the increase of rural income and the decrease of the
rural labor force and then gradually fallen down time. On the contrary, migrants
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with borrowing constraint have positive aggregate saving rate as they have to -
nance their human capital by themselves. This aggregate saving rate also suers
a little drop at the earliest migration time 13.6, however the trend is atter than
the one without borrowing constraint because the negative saving rate of migrants
during the transition period oset by positive saving rate of potential rural mi-
grants.
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Figure 5.12: Individual income ratio between urban and rural workers with and
without borrowing constraint
The ratio of individual income in urban areas of in rural areas is depicted in Figure
5.12. It is clear that borrowing constraints profoundly aect the income disparities
between rural and urban areas. If there is no any rural-urban migration, the
income gap between urban and rural areas constantly increases over time because
the income of urban workers rises up with the human capital growth and income of
rural workers keep the initial constant level. Without borrowing constraints, the
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ratio of individual income of urban and rural areas stays in the stable level after
rst migrants start moving into cities. In the opposite, with borrowing constraints,
after the temporary declining from the rst migration time the ratio of individual
income between urban and rural areas keeps rising over time. Therefore, borrowing
constraints for rural migrants lead to the increase in income disparities between
urban and rural areas.
5.5 Social welfare
In this section, the aggregate utility in the whole economy will be calculated,
which includes rural population based on above numerical results. For obtaining
this value, 100 year is chosen as truncation time, thus the function is
Vagg = Vmig  (x0   x(100)) + Vrur  x(100) + Vurb  (1  x0) (5.3)
Where basically x0 = 0:7.











 = 0:8 13.6 0.2077 -2.312 -1.5767
 = 0:5 27.5 0.4425 -2.6955 -2.4758
 = 0:3 54.0 0.5865 -2.7483 -2.7314
Notes: the  measures the degree of knowledge spillover in cities, no migration
tax and income transfer via government
Results have been showed in Table 5.3. Aggregate lifetime utility in the whole
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economy experiences 46.6%, 8.9% and 0.6% fall due to borrowing constraint while
 = 0:8, 0.5 and 0.3 respectively. It is obvious, borrowing constraint profoundly
aects the aggregate lifetime utility value, and the degree of its eect depends on
the external eect of human capital in cities. There have two main reasons for
the drastic drop while the external eect of human capital in cities is high: rstly
borrowing constraint decreases the individual lifetime utility value; secondly it de-
lays rural-urban migration, at truncation time 0.21 labor forces have still stayed
in rural land, in the contrary only 0.0032 rural labor forces stay home without
borrowing constraint 1. One percent increase of  with borrowing constraint will
add 0.8 aggregate utility value on average.











 = 0:1 14.6 0.2546 -2.4347 -1.6871
 = 0:3 17.5 0.3641 -2.6105 -2.1304
 = 0:6 26.9 0.5650 -2.7385 -2.1306
Notes: the  measures the degree of migration tax charged by local urban govern-
ment,  = 0:8 and no income transfer via government
The value of  measures the degree of migration tax and the results with borrowing
constraint and the migration tax have been showed in Table 5.4. Aggregate lifetime
utility in the whole economy is decreasing with the rise of the migration tax. The
negative eects of the migration tax on aggregate utility value with borrowing
constraint are more intense than without borrowing constraint. And one percent
decrease of  with borrowing constraint will increase 0.4 aggregate utility value on
average.
1The whole labor force has been assumed to equal 1
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The value of  measures the degree of income transfer by government for rural
migrants and the results with borrowing constraint and the income transfer has
been showed in Table 5.5. Aggregate lifetime utility in whole economy is increas-
ing with the rise of the income transfer with borrowing constraint and does not
change without borrowing constraint because migrants can smooth their lifetime
present value and consumptions.











 = 0:01 13.3 0.1861 -2.2800 -1.5767
 = 0:05 12.1 0.0920 -2.1311 -1.5767
 = 0:08 11.2 0.0114 -1.9942 -1.5767
Notes: the  measures the degree of income transfer via government for rural
migrants,  = 0:8 and no migration tax
Knowledge spillover (), migration tax () and income transfer by the government
() with borrowing constraint have the remarkable inuence on aggregate lifetime
utility value. Increase of the external level of human capital in cities, decrease of
the migration tax and increase of income transfer via the government in having a
positive inuence on aggregate utility value in the whole economy.
5.6 Summary
The main results of the numerical study are summarized by the following:
(1) Human capital spillover in cities, borrowing constraints and government poli-
cies inuence the rural-urban migration and the skill transformation. The
human capital spillover in cities is a push factor to attract people out of
rural land, borrowing constraints are a pull factor to keep people stay in
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rural land and government policies is a ambivalent factor which can either
alleviate or deteriorate the negative impact of borrowing constraints on hu-
man capital accumulation of low-skilled rural migrants and the rural-urban
migration process.
(2) Migrants with borrowing constraint postpone their migration time and have
to save money to nance their human capital accumulation in cities, and lose
some of social welfare as well. In addition, the rural saving rate rises up in
response to the self-nancing requirement of rural migrants. Furthermore,
the income disparities between urban and rural areas widen as well.
(3) Migration tax charged by local city government reduces the enthusiasm of
rural migrants, slow down knowledge transformation and also increase the
social welfare loss.
(4) Government subsidy for rural-urban migration can help mitigate the negative
eects of borrowing constraints faced by the low-skilled rural migrants. The
income transfer by a government subsidy encourages rural-urban migration,
speeds up knowledge transformation and raises the lifetime welfare of rural
migrants.
In summary, this extended endogenous rural-urban migration model can be used
to analyze the role of borrowing constraints in rural-urban migration process and
human capital accumulation of low-skilled rural workers. In addition, it also can
be used as a unied framework to shed light on China's recent experience of
urbanization and economic development and discuss key issues in contemporary
rural-urban migration policies in China.
Chapter 6
Policy Implications
6.1 New rural-urban migration regulation
Urbanization is an essential way to solve "agriculture, rural areas and farmers"
problems, upgrade industrial structure and adjust economic structure. However,
the household registration system, called as the Hukou system, directly controls
population allocation between rural and urban areas, and then hinders the urban-
ization process. The Chinese central government has been committed to reform
this inappropriate household registration system in order to improve the status
of rural population, reduce institutional barriers of rural-urban migration and de-
crease the income disparity between rural and urban sector.
In 2011, classied household migration policy implemented that the county-level
city, prefecture-level city and municipality can have dierent migration conditions
for the rural population. In the county-level city, rural migrants can apply for
the permanent urban residence only if they have a stable job or house in that
small city. In a prefecture-level city, only those migrants, who have at least three
years working experience, can be able to apply the permanent urban residence. In
a municipality or other vice-provincial city, where have the strictest regulations
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for the rural-urban population movement, only few high-skilled rural workers or
richer entrepreneur can successfully become an urban residence. Furthermore, this
reform policy claims to end discrimination against the rural population and oer
them the same opportunity of employment, school enrollment and skill training
in cities.
In terms of labor force mobility, this reform migration policy has made a signicant
progress than before. Rural people can easily access the labor market in cities,
but numerous problems not be solved yet. First, the communal facilities, health,
education, sanitation system and other public services in cities do not match with
an unexpected increase of rural-urban population transfer. Those rural migrants
still suer heavy burdens of high living cost in cities and less nancing channels
to invest in their human capital. Second, even if the municipality and other big
provincial cities strictly control its population migration, most of non-hukou ru-
ral migrants are living and working in big cities, which cause a series of social
problems, such as shantytown, pollution and crime. Likewise those migrants are
still doing low-skilled jobs and unable to accumulate their human capital. Con-
sequently, from the views of the previous model, this policy does not solve the
primary issue of the rural-urban migration - the skill transformation or human
capital accumulation of low-skilled rural workers.
Another recent debatable policy was the "land exchange household registration"
in some larger pilot city (such as Chongqing, Guangzhou), which was promoted
by the central government in 2009. This policy allowed rural residents to apply
for urban residence by handing in their contracted land and homestead to local
government. Not surprisingly, it suspended in 2011 because it regarded as the
compulsory administrative order and injured the right of the rural population
who would not like to change their land for permanent urban residence. Indeed
this compulsory policy may harm the rights of rural households since it merely
gives them an urban residence but does not provide the matching public urban
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services, for example school enrollment opportunities for rural migrants' children.
Nevertheless, the progressive meaning of this policy has to be admitted because
it breaks the barriers of rural land transaction. If rural households can have the
transaction right of their contracted land and homestead, they can more easily
move into urban areas in order to invest in their human capital and more quickly
integrate in urban. In other words, the liquidation of rural assets is an essential in
rural-urban migration. Therefore, "land exchange household registration" policy
clearly lacks a relevant channel to implement it. Increasing opportunities for access
to education and skill training for rural migrants is complementary of this policy.
Relaxing rural-urban migration regulation not only focusses on the rural labor
force mobility and change of household status, but should pay more attention on
the access to urban public services and increase of human capital level of rural
migrants.
6.2 Aordable housing
Aordable housing is a term used to describe dwelling units whose total housing
costs for either rented or purchased unit are deemed aordable to those that have
a low or median household income. The housing price-to-income ratio (PIR) is the
basic aordability measure for housing in an urban area. It is generally dened
as the ratio of the median house price to the median family income. In 1998,
China's central government changed his housing policies by ended direct housing
distribution through the employer-based system. Unfortunately, since 2005 urban
house prices increased drastically, house became the expensive goods even for most
urban residents, thus housing aordability has become a major issue. However,
China is confronted with implementing challenges of aordable housing.
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First, local government is lack of nancial support from central government for af-
fordable housing. Central government attempts to stabilize urban housing prices,
discourage speculative behavior of home buyers, and reduce the possible nancial
risks associated with the housing sector. In general, the central government sets
policies and local government is responsible for the construction, nancing, and
management of aordable housing. As the central government does not provide
direct nancial support to local governments for aordable housing, the local gov-
ernment lacks motivation and nancial means to develop aordable housing. They
prefer oering state-owned land to the highest bidder among developers through
the auction process to maximize revenue. Thus, aordable housing projects usu-
ally locate in low-priced state-owned land. Moreover, the gap between supply and
demand for aordable housing is still huge in cities.
Second, migrants' demand for aordable housing is typically ignored by the local
government. Reported by NBS of China, around 147 million migrants from ru-
ral low-income families need housing assistance. However, the current aordable
housing system is targeted only at urban residents who have urban residence per-
mits as part of its household registration system. Migrants have to nd shelter in
the informal housing market or buy high price commodity house which most of
them hardly can aord it.
Hence, supply of aordable housing and license of buying aordable house for
rural migrants becomes substantial barriers for rural-urban migration. Superior
urban housing price impedes permeate rural-urban migration. In addition, a rise
of living cost in cities in the presence of binding borrowing constraints for low-
skilled rural workers will decrease the incentive for investment in human capital
accumulation. Therefore, the role of central and local government is important.
They should expand supply of aordable housing and oer the right for rural
migrants to buy those inexpensive houses to speed up urbanization and accelerate
skill transformation from low-skilled rural workers to high-skilled urban workers.
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6.3 Student loans system
Student loan system is a direct income transfer by the government. In China, stu-
dent loans mainly include three types: national student loan system, interest-free
loan for university students provided by national nance capital, and commercial
student loans. National Student Loan is regarded as the major means to solve the
educational fairness. This was implemented from 1990 as China aimed to improve
the human capital level by expansion of tertiary education enrollment and had
made a signicant achievement. National enrollment number of college or univer-
sity increased 3.65 times from 1800000 in 1998 to 6570000 in 2010, but share of
poor students to total students is approximately 23%. The purpose of a student
loan is to help those needy students to pay the tuition fee, accommodation fee and
living expenses.
However, the implementation of national student loan system faces a great number
of diculties and problems.
(1) Low reimbursement of student loan
As reported, only 50% graduated students with student loan actively provide
graduation destination and repay their loan in 2003, when the rst group of
students with a loan entered into the repayment period. Moreover, the bad
reimbursement rate of graduate student was 12.88% and increased to 28%
in 2006, and then gives pressure on the bank to continue to issue student
loans because national student loan is a kind of unsecured, no pledge and no
mortgage loan. It is dicult to compel the student to repay after graduation
without punishment mechanism.
(2) Deviation of student loan
Since higher bad repayment rate of student loan, lots of the bank wouldn't
like to oer a national student loan without a specic way to avoid defaulting
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on this type of loan. Therefore, national student loan in inclined to oer to
students in key universities, such as Peking University, Tsuhuang University
and other "211" universities because students graduated from key university
are believed to have high income and willing to repayment after graduation.
Consequently, the distribution of national student loans across college and
university is not equitable for poor students since lots of students from low-
income household are in general college or university. Table 6.1 shows the
national student loans expenditure in 2009. The general university shared
the 31.5% of all national student loans, in the opposite, the college and other
types of tertiary school only shared 8.3% of them.





Tertiary school 22.5 40.47
General university 17.5 31.47
College 0.8 1.43
Tertiary vocational school 3.8 6.83
Adult tertiary school 0.5 0.9
Secondary vocational school 10.5 18.88
Secondary school 12.8 23.02
Primary school 9.8 17.63
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, NBS.
(3) Asymmetric risk and prot of student loan for bank
Student loan is not completely market-oriented loan because it includes so-
cial and political meanings. So back is lack of ecient way to guarantee re-
payment of a student loan. As pursuing prots as an objective, bank always
does the best to reduce non-performing loan ratio and improve the quality of
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loan assets. Therefore bank usually has baincentive to decrease account of
national student loans. Consequently, without student loans, students from
low-income households have to give up the opportunity of entering tertiary
school.
As previous s demonstrated, borrowing constraint postpones knowledge trans-
formation and rural-urban migration, and decreases the social welfare as well.
Therefore, state government must encourage student enrollment from low-income
rural households by expanding student loans and increase the incentive for issuing
student loan from the bank by building personal credit system and supporting
regulation system to ensure reimbursement of student loans.
6.4 Summary
From the point of view of the extended Lucas-type endogenous rural-urban model,
the skill transformation is the fundamental issue of the urbanization process and
economic development. Institutional barriers and borrowing constraints are slow
the skill transformation from low-skilled rural workers to high-skilled urban work-
ers by hindering rural-urban migration and delaying investment of rural human
capital. In China's urbanization and knowledge transfer process there have three
main issues which deeply inuence the ability of human capital accumulation of
low-skilled rural migrants with borrowing constrains: liquidation of rural assets,
access to urban public services and social welfare as well as the opportunity of ed-
ucation and skill training. In summary, the major problem of urbanization-related
policies is to solve the diculties of human capital investment of low-skilled rural
migrants with borrowing constraint.
In this chapter, we discuss three important urbanization-related policies: house-
hold registration system reform policy, aordable housing policy and the student
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loans system in China. We suggest that China must continue to implement the
reform of the household registration system to push the economic structural ad-
justment from the dualistic rural-urban to the integration of rural and urban ar-
eas. In addition government must not only politically but also nancially support
aordable housing policies for rural migrants to accelerate their human capital ac-
cumulation in cities. Furthermore, the student loans system is another signicant
aspect to increase the human capital level and accelerate skill transformation.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Signicance and Contribution
This thesis proposes the Lucas-type endogenous rural-urban migration model in-
corporating the borrowing constraint and applies the results of the model to shed
lights on China's recent experience of urbanization and economic development. It
contributes to the following aspects.
First, it extends Lucas' migration model to show the inuence of borrowing con-
straints on the rural-urban migration process and the human capital accumulation
of low-skilled rural workers in urban areas. Borrowing constraint is crucial for rural
households to make the migration decision as well as their human capital accu-
mulation because they are unable to borrow from future income. This research
shows the borrowing constraint aects not only the spatial relocation of the labor
force, but also retards the skill transformation from low-skilled rural workers to
high-skilled urban workers. In addition, it hinders the industrial upgrading and
economic structure transition, and slows down economic progress.
Second, borrowing constraint inuences the consumption and saving pattern of
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rural households. Based on the model discussed in this thesis, the consumption
and saving pattern is dierent with and without borrowing constraint. Without
borrowing constraint, rural households can nance their migration by borrowing
money from future high income in cities and need not to consider savings. In
opposite, with the borrowing constraint, rural households have to save money to
invest in their human capital after migrating to cities. Thus, high rural saving
rate is a signal of borrowing constraint and it is useful to further empirical study.
Furthermore, income disparities between urban and rural areas also rise over time
due to borrowing constraints for rural migrants.
Third, this model studies some eects of government policies on rural-urban mi-
gration. One case is about migration cost charged by local government and nds
that this cost slows down the human capital accumulation and economic growth.
Then, the government subsidy for rural migrants is also considered and nds that
it actually helps speed up the rural-urban migration and economic growth. Con-
sequently, government policies are vital for rural-urban migration and knowledge
transformation.
Finally, this unied framework can help to shed lights on China's contemporary
experience of rural-urban migration and human capital accumulation and evaluate
several key issues in current rural-urban migration policies in China. The insights
from this model argue that the welfare implications of various rural-urban migra-
tion policy issues currently debated in China can be better understood from the
point of view of mitigating the nancing constraint for human capital accumula-
tion by low-skilled migrant families.
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7.2 Further Research Directions
There are some limitations in the thesis. Because of lack of data in China, it
is hard to do empirical studies on the human capital accumulation of low-skilled
rural migrants in the urbanization process. Therefore, further research can be
done in the following three directions.
(1) This extended model can be improved by additional studies. One thing we
must do is to study the empirical estimation of human capital accumulation
of rural migrants to explore whether the borrowing constraint is directly re-
lated to the skill transformation. This is important and useful to improve
the explanation of the model discussed in this thesis.
(2) We need to do an empirical study to estimate the impact of borrowing con-
straint on the urbanization process. Lucas (2009, [74]) showed that openness
was used to measure the external eect of human capital in an empirical
study. In addition, the saving pattern of rural households is tightly asso-
ciated with the borrowing constraint. Hence, we also can use this variable
empirically to evaluate the eect of borrowing constraint on consumption
and savings of rural households if appropriate data are available.
(3) We can testify to the specic impact of dierent institutional policies empir-
ically based on the insights from this model. For instance, we can estimate
whether the urban low-income housing benets need to be extended to rural
migrant families to encourage their human capital accumulation in cities for
the benet of the whole economy.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Without credit constraint, lifetime utility value can be written by
V = V 1 + V 2 =
Z T
0
e t ln cet dt+
Z 1
T
e t ln ce(t T ) dt (7.1)
Where T is the catch-up time. And lifetime present value is
PV = PV 1 + PV 2 =
Z T
0
e rt F 0(x(t)) dt+
Z 1
T
e rt uH(t) dt =
c
r    (7.2)





= PV 1  c










Because PV = PV 1 + PV 2 = PV 10 + PV 20 if T is costant. Therefore we can
obtain
c
r   (1  e






c0 =  c(e(r )T   1) (7.3)






























































Combining above equations and substituting 7.3, we obtain
V 0 = V 10 + V 20











Because for any c >= 0 and T >= 0, e T <= 1 and eT >= 1,









(eT   1) >= 0 (7.4)
Therefore the propostion 1 has been proved.
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Proof of proposition 2
Let PV = PVm   PV  0, thus the lifetime present value with migration tax
is:
PV 1m = PV 1  PV
PV 2m = PV 2
And also let cm (cm  0) measure s the change of consumption with both of
credit constraint and migration tax. Meanwhile, if catch-up time Tm is same as






























V 2m = V 2
Combining above equation, we obtain
Vm = V 1m + V 2m
















The proposition 2 has been proved.
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Proof of proposition 3
Let cs (cs  0) measure s the change of consumption with both of credit
constraint and government subsidy. Meanwhile, if catch-up time Tm is same as





= PV 1  c











and according to equation (7.2), we have
cS
r   (1  e





As above we did, the lifetime value of utiltiy with government subsidy is













Because for any cm >= 0 and T >= 0, e
 T <= 1 and eT >= 1,









(eT   1) >= 0 (7.6)
The proposition 3 has been proved.
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